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1 Introduction
In the Kyoto Protocol (KP), initially adopted on 11 December 1997, 37 countries (and the
European Union), the so called Annex B countries, which roughly resembled the industrial-
ized world in the 1990s, committed to reduce the emissions of six greenhouse gases (GHGs)
by 5.2% on average over the period between 2008 to 2012 compared to 1990 levels by ac-
cepting individual emission targets that had to be met by the end of 2012. Ever since its
emergence the KP has been heavily criticized.1 Also the economic profession found little
praise for the KP: While the theoretical literature on climate treaties produced disillusioning
findings regarding the likelihood of a global agreement (see, e.g., Finus 2008 for a review of
this literature), Barrett (1998) argued that the KP hardly deters non-participation and non-
compliance. Copeland and Taylor (2005) criticize that its design neglects important lessons
from trade theory, while some authors animadvert the level of the emission targets (e.g.,
Tol 2000) or discuss the challenges of the flexibility mechanisms (Zhang and Wang 2011).
Despite this widespread criticism, the KP and its approach are supported by a recent and in-
creasing body of empirical literature on the effectiveness of the KP. Aichele and Felbermayr
(2012), Aichele and Felbermayr (2013) and Grunewald and Martinez-Zarzoso (2016) con-
sistently find that countries with binding emission targets under the KP have lower CO2
emissions than they would have had in the absence of these targets. In fact, they estimate
a statistically significant average CO2 reduction effect of 7 to 10%.
In this paper, we test for the existence of observable emission reductions in 15 major Western
Annex B countries with binding GHG emission targets under the KP. To this end, we
consider a country’s ratification of a binding emission target under the KP as a “treatment”
and investigate its effect. To do so it is crucial to identify the counterfactual GHG emissions
that each treated country would have had emitted in the absence of treatment. The resulting
difference, the treatment effect, is a measure of the effectiveness of the KP in the sense that
it elicits the success of a particular country to reduce GHG emissions given that the KP
entered into force.2
In eliciting this treatment effect we are confronted with four major obstacles. First, to elicit
1 In December 1997 The Economist (1997) already prognosticated that the US will never be able to ratify
the KP, as it would never be approved by the US Senate. Prins and Rayner (2007) criticize its inflexible
top-down architecture, which had been borrowed from past international treaties regulating chlorofluoro-
carbons, sulphur emissions and nuclear weapons, and “was always the wrong tool for the nature of the
job.”
2 Note that this treatment effect cannot elicit any effect that the KP (or its enaction) might have had on
the emissions of all countries (e.g., due to an increase in public awareness), treated or non-treated. In this
sense the treatment effect may underestimate the effectiveness of the KP. To estimate this “total” effect,
we would need to observe a twin Earth that is identical to our Earth in all aspects short of the enaction
of the KP. Obviously, there is no way to construct such an ideal counterfactual.
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the treatment effect it is crucial that there are other countries that did not receive the
treatment. With the respect to the KP, the “non-Annex B countries”, i.e. all countries that
are not Annex B countries, had no binding GHG emissions targets and, thus, are the natural
candidates for the non-treated control group. If all countries were equal in all relevant
aspects apart from receiving the treatment or not, the treatment effect would be given
by the difference in GHG emissions of treated and non-treated countries. Unfortunately,
there is a clear selection bias with respect to the treatment: Annex B countries roughly
cover the industrialized world in the 1990s. As a consequence, non-Annex B countries differ
significantly with respect to relevant country characteristics. Most importantly, this selection
into treatment leads to a violation of the common trend assumption (see Section 2).
Second, the timing of the treatment is not obvious. One might argue that the date of
ratification is the treatment event, as only from that point onwards a country adopted the
emission target into national legislation and, thereby, certifies that it considers the emission
target imposed by the KP as binding. However, there are two other plausible dates for
the time of treatment: (i) We consider December 1997, when the KP was adopted, as the
earliest date at which these emission reduction targets may have influenced the countries
that finally ratified the KP, as the emission targets were already known then. (ii) After
the US withdrew its support in 2001 it was not clear whether the KP will actually enter
into force, because of the two hurdles the KP had to take.3 Due to this uncertainty, even
countries that ratified the KP may have been reluctant to take costly measures to reduce
GHG emissions before the KP entered into force.
Third, non-Annex B countries face an additional problem that may invalidate them as
suitable controls. According to the rules of the KP, Annex B countries may achieve their
emission targets either via domestic emission reductions or through the use of one of the
three flexibility mechanisms: emissions trading (EM), joint implementation (JI) and clean
development mechanism (CDM). Although the KP clearly states that the use of flexibility
mechanisms should only be supplemental to domestic emission reduction efforts, they may
blur the distinction between treated and non-treated countries. In particular the CDM
encourages Annex B countries to cooperate with non-Annex B countries to reduce GHG
emissions of non-Annex B countries. These emission reductions in non-Annex B countries
can then be credited to the reduction target of the supporting Annex B countries. Thus,
also the emissions of non-Annex B countries may be influenced by the KP, even though they
do not face any direct reduction obligations.
Fourth, emissions in non-Annex B countries and Annex B countries that did not ratify
3 According to the rules of the KP, it only enters into force if at least 55 countries ratify it and ratifying
countries account for at least 55% of 1990 GHG emissions from Annex B countries. The KP took both
hurdles with Russia’s ratification in November 2004 and became effective in early 2005.
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the KP may be influenced by an additional channel. Policies enacted in Annex B countries
to comply with binding emission targets may not only cause GHG emissions reductions
in these countries but may also be accompanied by GHG emission increases in countries
without binding emission targets (often called carbon leakage). For example, the production
of energy intensive goods may relocate to countries without binding emission targets and
laxer environmental regulation.
Both CDM and carbon leakage may violate the stable unit treatment value assumption
(SUTVA). However, they have effects in opposite directions. While with CDM emissions of
treated countries increase and the emissions of non-treated countries decrease (compared to
the situation without CDM), it is the other way round with carbon leakage. Thus, the viola-
tion of the SUTVA due to CDM (carbon leakage) is likely to underestimate (overestimate)
any treatment effect the KP had on the reduction of GHG emissions of Annex B countries
with binding emission targets. As a consequence, the differences in GHG emissions between
treated and non-treated countries are not solely due to the adoption of binding emission
targets. They are rather a combination of GHG emission reductions in treated countries
because of policies enacted to comply with the binding emission target (the treatment effect
we like to elicit) and GHG emission increases (reductions) in treated and GHG emission
reductions (increases) in non-treated countries because of CDM (carbon leakage).
To address these four challenges, we employ the synthetic control method (SCM) developed
by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Abadie et al. (2010), and Abadie et al. (2015), which
constructs counterfactuals for each treated country by a weighted average of non-treated
countries such that the actual country and its synthetic counterpart coincide as much as
possible with respect to emissions before the treatment and in all other relevant economic
characteristics that are unaffected by it. In particular, the SCM allows us to address the
violation of the common trend assumption by re-balancing treated units and controls with
respect to the pre-treatment development of GHG emissions and other important predictors
of selection into the treatment. In addition, we use two different control groups to estimate
counterfactual GHG emissions for treated countries: (i) non-Annex B countries and (ii) US
state-level data. The latter has the advantage that it suffers less from a selection bias and
is also immune to SUTVA violations due to CDM. However, data on some covariates that
are available for non-Annex B countries is not available for US state-level data.
To address the issue of the timing of treatment we consider the date of ratification as
the treatment event in our main specification and run two robustness checks with 1997,
the date of adoption of the KP, and 2004, the date of the KP entering into force as the
time of treatment. We also run a robustness check to control for CDM and other flexible
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mechanisms, but there is little we can do to control for carbon leakage.4 However, as the
violation of the SUTVA due to carbon leakage leads to overestimating the real treatment
effect of the enaction of binding emission targets, it would only be a concern in case we
found significant negative treatment effects.
Yet, we find no statistically significant and persistent treatment effect for any of the Annex B
countries under investigation. This holds no matter which date we consider as the treatment
event, whether we use non-Annex B countries or US states as the control group, which
dependent variable we investigate (CO2 emissions, CO2 intensity, CO2 per capita or GHG
emissions), whether we account for flexible mechanisms under the KP or whether we run
a standard difference-in-differences approach (while controlling for the opposing trends).
However, more drastic interventions like the collapse of the former Soviet Union did have a
significant effect on economic output and, as a consequence, on the CO2 emissions of Eastern
European countries. We also find that – overall – the use of US states as the control group
is preferable, as the emission paths and other economic characteristics are very similar to
those of Annex B countries. Finally, we argue that the applied econometrician faces very
similar challenges when analyzing other types of international environmental policies. As a
consequence, the application of the SCM, which allows us to address all these challenges
simultaneously, may be preferable to more traditional panel data approaches.
2 The Synthetic Control Method
In this paper we aim to assess the effectiveness of the KP with respect to its primary target,
i.e. the reduction of GHG emissions in Annex B countries with binding emission targets.
In the following, we explain our empirical strategy to elicit the treatment effect of being
committed to a specific emission target under the KP. The main challenge for estimating
such an effect is a missing data problem (Rubin 1976), as we cannot observe a particular
country having both a binding emission target and no emission target at the same time.
Thus, it is crucial that we can observe other countries or regions that did not receive the
treatment. In our case these can be countries/regions without any binding GHG emission
targets under the KP or countries/regions that would have had binding emission targets
under the KP but did not ratify it. In fact, we use two different control groups to estimate
counterfactual GHG emissions for treated countries: (i) non-Annex B countries plus the US
and (ii) US state-level data.5 We consider the US and US states as non-treated with respect
4 However, see Aichele and Felbermayr (2013) for an assessment of the changes in trade related GHG emis-
sions due to the KP.
5 For the remainder of the paper we often refer to the former control group as “non-Annex B countries”.
Obviously, this is not literally correct but simpler and shorter than “non-Annex B countries plus the US”.
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to the KP, as the US did not ratify and, thus, never had any binding obligations under the
KP.
However, countries with and without binding emission targets may differ systematically
with respect to both their emission paths and other important country characteristics.
In particular, the common trend assumption, the key identifying assumption in settings
where we observe the outcome of interest for treated units and controls prior and after
the intervention, may be violated. It says that – in the absence of the treatment – treated
units and controls must share a common trend.6 Figure 1 shows the aggregated (average)
CO2 emissions of Annex B and non-Annex B countries and US states relative to their 1997
emissions between 1980 and 2011. We observe that CO2 emissions were relatively stable
for Annex B countries, while they increased considerably for non-Annex B countries in
particular after 2000. Also US states show a significantly different trend of CO2 emissions
before 1997 compared to Annex B countries. While the different development in the post-
treatment period, i.e. after 1997, may be the effect of the treatment, the differences in the
pre-treatment period give rise to serious concerns. Although it is impossible to directly
test for a common trend without imposing strong assumptions about the treatment effect,
the drastic and statistically significant differences in pre-treatment trends shown in Figure
1 provide strong support for a violation of the common trend assumption in case of the
KP. Apart from the differences in trends, non-Annex B countries also differ significantly
with respect to other relevant country characteristics (see Section 3). Therefore, average
GHG emissions of countries with targets cannot be simply compared to average emissions
of countries that have none, i.e. the assignment of emission targets cannot be treated as
random (Rubin 1976, 1978, 2005).
There are several potential strategies to solve this problem (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009).
In cases as ours, where different groups are either exposed or not exposed to some kind
of treatment over a certain time period, the most often applied method is a differences-in-
differences (DiD) approach (Bertrand et al. 2004) or some extension of it. Yet, we employ
the synthetic control method developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Abadie et al.
(2010), and Abadie et al. (2015), which constructs counterfactuals for each treated country
(i.e., Annex B country that ratified the KP and, thus, is subject to GHG emission targets)
by a weighted average of non-treated regions (i.e., regions without binding emission targets
under the KP) such that the actual country and its synthetic counterpart coincide as much
as possible with respect to emissions before the treatment and in all relevant economic char-
acteristics that are unaffected by it. The SCM exhibits three key advantages over classical
DiD estimation that renders it particularly suitable for the present research question.
6 Differences in the absolute value of the outcome of interest and (to some extend) covariates are less of a
problem, as they can be absorbed by the use of fixed-effects.
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Figure 1: Development of average CO2 emissions for Annex B countries, non-Annex B coun-
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Note: Graph shows aggregated CO2 emissions relative to 1997 emissions for all Annex B countries, non-Annex B
countries for which data is available for the period 1980–2011 and US states. For Annex B countries this excludes
many Eastern European countries (e.g., Russia and the Ukraine), as data start in 1990 or later. Including Eastern
European countries would lead to a significant dip starting in the late 1980s/early 1990s due to the collapse of the
Former Soviet Union, as shown in Grunewald and Martinez-Zarzoso (2016).
First, the SCM is able to re-balance treated units and controls with respect to both (i)
the pre-treatment development of the GHG emissions themselves and (ii) important predic-
tors of selection into the treatment. Second, the SCM allows to estimate the counterfactual
emissions path for every single country and every year following the adoption of the KP.
Thus, we do not only get an average effect for all countries and all time periods under
investigation, but we are also able to identify country-year-specific developments and char-
acteristics. Third, the standard DiD approach faces an additional challenge when analyzing
counterfactual outcomes. On the one hand, a country’s level of GHG emissions depends on
several socio-economic factors that should be controlled for in a regression analysis to avoid
an omitted variable bias. On the other hand, almost all of these factors may also be influ-
enced by the treatment and therefore constitute bad controls according to the definition of
6
Angrist and Pischke (2008).7 In contrast to DiD, the SCM is flexible in the sense that one
can control for these factors using only pre-treatment information.
Suppose that there are J + 1 countries where j = 1 denotes the treated country – which,
in our case, corresponds to a binding emission target under the KP – and j = 2, . . . , J + 1
are all untreated countries or US states in the donor pool. In addition, let T0 be the time
of treatment.8 For the treated country we have data about the actual emission path (Y1t),
but we are ignorant about the counterfactual emissions which would have occurred if this
country would not have been subject to the treatment (Y N1t for t > T0). Thus, we have to
find an estimate for Y N1t to obtain an estimate for the treatment effect α1t = Y1t − Y
N
1t .
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Abadie et al. (2010), and Abadie et al. (2015) propose to
make use of the observed characteristics of the countries in the control group or donor pool.
The underlying idea is to find weights W = (ω2, ..., ωJ+1)
′, with ωj ≥ 0 for j = 2, . . . , J + 1
and
∑J+1
j=2 ωj = 1, such that the weighted average of all countries in the donor pool resembles
the treated country with respect to GHG emissions in the pre-intervention period and all
other relevant aspects (Z). Formally, we seek W such that:
J+1∑
j=2
ω⋆jYjt = Y1t for all t < T0 and
J+1∑
j=2





jYjt for t ≥ T0 is an estimate for the unobserved counterfactual emissions path
Y N1t inducing an estimate for the treatment effect:
α̂1t = Y1t −
J+1∑
j=2
ω⋆jYjt , t ≥ T0 . (2)
In general, a vector W such that equations (1) hold may not exist (in particular, if there
are structural differences between treated countries and controls). However, one can choose




′V (X1 − X0W ) , (3)
where X1 denotes a (k× 1) vector of pre-intervention characteristics of the treated country,
which may include the pre-intervention emission path, and X0 denotes a (k × J) matrix
of the same variables for the J countries in the donor pool (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003,
7 For example, investments to reduce GHG emissions may have an impact on GDP per capita, CO2 intensity,
electricity production, etc.
8 Throughout the paper, we consider the year of the treatment event as the treatment year if the event took
place in the third or forth quarter and we consider the year before the event as the treatment year if the
event took place in the first or second quarter.
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Abadie et al. 2010, 2015). The symmetric and positive definite matrix V weights the relative
importance of the various characteristics included in X. Obviously, the optimal weights W
depend on the weighting matrix V . We follow Abadie et al. (2010) in choosing V by using
a regression based method and equal weights.9
As the SCM does not provide classical standard errors to infer statistical significance,
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Abadie et al. (2010), and Abadie et al. (2015) suggest to
run placebo or permutation tests. The underlying idea is to estimate counterfactual emission
paths for regional entities in the donor pool. In an ideal world we would find no treatment
effects for all countries in the donor pool and all post-treatment years, as the countries in the
donor pool did not receive any treatment. However, in practice we will always find placebo
treatment effects to at least some extend. As a consequence, we only consider the actual
treatment effect to be statistically significant if it is significantly larger than the placebo
treatment effects.
Our inference approach rests on a combination of two refinements of the classical placebos
studies that have been proposed by Abadie et al. (2010) and Abadie et al. (2015). First, we
run a placebo treatment on all countries in the donor pool and select the top 19 countries/US
states in terms of pre-treatment root mean squared prediction error (RMSPE) to avoid
rejecting the significance of treatment effects on the basis of outliers within the placebos
studies. Second, we calculate the ratio between the treatment effect (the root mean squared
treatment effect) and the pre-treatment RMSPE for all 20 countries (the top 19 countries
from the placebo treatment plus the treated country) for each year of the post-treatment
period. For each year of the post-treatment period, we then calculate a probability that
resembles the relative frequency that a randomly chosen country out of the 20 countries
in the placebo test has a RMSPE ratio that is at least as large than that of the treated
country. We use a combination of the two refinements as proposed by Abadie et al. (2010)
and Abadie et al. (2015), as placebos with large pre-treatment RMSPE, i.e. a poor fit,
are likely to experience large placebo treatment effects in the post-treatment period and,
therefore, lead not only to (i) large treatment/placebo effects but also (ii) large RMSPE
ratios. Finally, we consider the treatment effect of the treated country for a particular post-
treatment year to be significant if none of the 19 countries with placebo treatments shows a
larger RMSPE ratio than the actual treated unit, i.e. the relative frequency of finding such
an effect by randomly drawing one out of the 20 countries is 1/20 = 0.05.
9 For further discussion on the synthetic control method including several extensions, see Abadie et al.
(2010) and Abadie et al. (2015).
8
3 Data
We analyze the effect of being committed to an emission target under the KP. Out of the
37 Annex B countries, the US did not ratify the KP. As a consequence, we consider it as
not treated. In addition, we excluded all Eastern European countries from the empirical
analysis due to limited data availability and the peculiarities of the Former Soviet Union
(see also Section 5.4). We also excluded Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Monaco, New
Zealand, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg and Switzerland due to limited data availability or
highly volatile GHG emission paths which are common for small countries and difficult to
match.10 Thus, the remaining 15 treated countries under investigation are: Australia, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. With respect to GHG emissions, these countries are
responsible for approximately 50% of total 1990 GHG emissions of the countries with binding
emission targets under the KP. In order to reduce the imbalance in country characteristics
between Annex B and non-Annex B countries as much as possible, we restrict the country-
level control group to countries being classified as high income and upper middle income
countries by the World Bank.
Throughout our analysis we use CO2 emissions as a proxy for GHG emissions (except for one
robustness check in Section 5). The reason is that GHG emissions data is only available from
1990 onwards, while data for CO2 emissions run back to 1980 and earlier.
11 Moreover, CO2
emissions are by far the most important GHG gas and there is a strong positive correlation
between CO2 and other GHG emissions.
As detailed in Section 2, we use the SCM to create the specific counterfactual country for
each treated country via a convex combination of all units in the donor pool. To increase the
comparability of countries we normalize the outcome of interest (CO2 emissions) with the
year of treatment T0 as the base year (Cavallo et al. 2013). Our set of predictors when using
non-Annex B countries in the donor pool includes: Several years of normalized (treatment
year=1) CO2 emissions
12; the averages of two 5-year periods prior to the treatment for
all predictors (e.g., 1987–1991 and 1992–1996 for 1997 as treatment), i.e. GDP per capita,
GDP growth, human capital index, life expectancy, agricultural, industry and services value
added, an indicator for the level of democracy versus autocracy, an indicator for the level
of political rights and population growth; and the averages for two sub-periods of the post-
treatment periods (e.g., 2000–2005 and 2006–2011) for life expectancy, human capital index
10 In addition, the GHG emissions of these countries play a very minor role for aggregate GHG emissions.
11 In addition, the GHG emissions data, stemming from CAIT Climate Data Explorer of the World Re-
sources Institute, exhibit much smaller year to year volatility than the CO2 emissions data from the World
Development Indicators provided by the World Bank.
12 More specifically, we use 1981, 1983, 1985, ....
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and population growth. In doing so, we assume that the latter three variables will not
be affected by the treatment and, therefore, do not constitute bad controls in the sense
of Angrist and Pischke (2008). Our choice of predictors is guided by three desiderata: (i)
Predictors must be available for all treated countries and should be available for as many
countries in the donor pool as possible. (ii) Predictors should account for the underlying
causes of variations in GHG emissions across countries such as economic power and industry
structure. (iii) Finally, indicators should particularly target the selection bias for treatment,
i.e. developed versus developing countries. As a consequence, we include indicators such as
life expectancy, human capital and political rights, as these indicators are strongly correlated
with economic development.13
Unfortunately, several of the above listed variables are not available for US states.14 Thus,
we rely on several years of normalized (treatment year=1) CO2 emissions, GDP per capita,
GDP growth, and population growth when using US states as the donor pool. As we do
expect differences in the classification and coding between country level and US state-level
data, in particular for GDP, we use the changes rather then the levels (as for non-Annex B
countries) with respect to the treatment year values.15 More specifically, we use normalized
per capita GDP, GDP growth and population growth for, e.g., 1987–1991 and 1992–1996
and, in addition, population growth data for 2000–2005 and 2006–2010 (1997 as treatment
year).
The data used in the empirical analysis stem from several different sources. Data on country-
level CO2 emissions, value added for agriculture, industry and services, GDP growth, life
expectancy and population growth are taken from the World Development Indicators pub-
lished by the World Bank. GDP per capita and the human capital index originate from the
Penn World Tables published by the University of Groningen. The two political economy
indicators on democracy versus autocracy (poilty2) and political rights are taken from the
Polity IV project and from data published by the Freedom House. Additional information on
the KP (list of Annex B countries with targets) stems from the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). US state-level information on CO2 emissions
13 The categorization of Annex B countries strongly resembles the industrialized world in the 1990s. Histor-
ically, industrialized countries have been predominantly characterized by their sectoral composition and
their levels of GDP per capita. More recently, however, the literature draws on a more diverse set of mea-
sures including human capital, life expectancy and political economy indicators, which – in sum – are seen
to adequately distinguish industrialized countries from developing countries and countries in transition
(e.g., UNDP 1990).
14 However, in contrast to non-Annex B countries the differences between Annex B countries with binding
emissions targets and US states are much smaller for measures such as life expectancy, human capital
index, etc. (US averages over the period from 1987–1997 for life expectancy: 75.44 years, human capital
index: 3.45, Serv. value added: 72.3, Pol. rights: 1, Polity2: 10). As a consequence, it is also less important
to control for them in our analysis.
15 We expect these differences to be constant over time and therefore focus on the changes in order to
eliminate any inconsistencies.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N P-values
Annex B countries (under investigation)
CO2 emissions 326’184.26 319’850.17 29’247.99 1’205’610.59 165
GDP per capita 23’439.94 5’485.69 10’401.74 43’569.25 165
GDP growth 2.15 2.09 -6.51 7.60 165
Human Capital Index 2.77 0.29 2.19 3.3 165
Life expectancy 76.85 1.31 73.67 80.42 165
Agri. value added∗ 3.52 1.82 1.22 13.93 165
Ind. value added∗ 31.05 3.1 23.56 38.41 165
Serv. valued added∗ 65.42 3.21 58.46 73.23 165
Population growth 0.48 0.39 -0.22 1.78 165
Pol. rights 1.01 0.11 1 2 161
Polity2 9.93 0.25 9 10 161
GHG emissions 407.25 369.28 43.66 1300.15 120
High income and upper middle income Non-Annex B countries+
CO2 emissions 147’497.62 656’750.94 11.00 5.42e+06 822 0.00
GDP per capita 10’857.28 10’709.68 335.49 6’7883.89 694 0.00
GDP growth 2.13 7.50 -42.62 90.88 813 0.07
Human Capital Index 2.36 0.37 1.68 3.52 511 0.00
Life expectancy 69.83 5.99 40.97 80.13 823 0.00
Agri. value added∗ 11.24 10.21 0.00 67.38 687 0.00
Ind. value added∗ 33.20 12.64 8.02 74.67 678 0.13
Serv. valued added∗ 55.49 14.21 8.24 90.63 679 0.00
Population growth 1.81 1.70 -6.49 16.51 994 0.00
Pol. rights 3.61 2.22 1.00 7.00 729 0.00
Polity2 1.28 7.31 -10.00 10.00 531 0.00
GHG emissions 225.63 874.69 0.12 6592.37 542 0.01
US states
CO2 emissions 100’982.17 103’210.82 4’200.00 679’600.00 561 0.00
GDP per capita 27’514.78 9’703.95 15’468 87’544 561 0.03
GDP growth 1.98 2.57 -12.90 11.90 561 0.00
Population growth 0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.07 561 0.00
GHG emissions 122.72 122.27 4.66 805.07 408 0.00
Note: Descriptive statistics for each (sub-)sample and the 11 years (1987–1997) prior to the treatment, i.e. the adoption
of the KP. The p-values in the last column are based on t-tests for the equality of means between Annex B countries
and the two potential control groups. GHG data are in Mt of CO2 equivalent.
∗: in % of GDP, +: not sufficient data available for some non-Annex countries, i.e. they are not part of the donor pool.
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Figure 2: Synthetic Control for Canada based on
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Note: Actual and synthetic CO2 emission path for Canada. The solid line stands for the actual Canadian CO2 emissions
whereas the dashed line represents the synthetic Canada, i.e. the counterfactual emission path, based on non-Annex
B country data (left) and US state-level data (right). N is the number of countries in the donor pool used for the
placebo studies and we display the figures for the pre-treatment RMSPE. The numbers underneath the lines indicate
the treatment effects in percent and the corresponding probabilities in parenthesis (see Section 2).
is taken from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), real GDP per capita and
GDP growth stem from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and population data is
based on the Population Estimates Program (PEP) of the United States Census Bureau.
Data on GHG emissions in CO2 equivalent emissions on country and US state level stems
from the CAIT Climate Data Explorer of the World Resources Institute. Table 1 shows the
summary statistics for all data used in the empirical analysis. We observe a predictor imbal-
ance for Annex B countries, non-Annex B countries and US states for the 11 years prior to
the adoption of the KP, i.e. 1987–1997. In fact, there is a statistically significant difference
for most predictors between Annex B and non-Annex B countries and also between Annex
B countries and US states. Yet, the differences between Annex B countries and US states
are much smaller in magnitude.
4 Results
In the following, we report the results for the two different specifications, where either
selected non-Annex B countries or US states act as non-treated control entities from which
we construct the counterfactual CO2 emission paths of the 15 Annex B countries under
investigation. We consider ratification as the treatment event.
As a representative example, Figure 2 shows the normalized CO2 emissions path of Canada
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(solid line) and its synthetic counterfactuals (dashed line) based on non-Annex B countries
(left) and US states (right). We observe that for both specifications the synthetic controls
for Canada matches actual CO2 emissions very well in the pre-treatment period (up to
2002). This is also evident from the small RMSPE values of 0.0693 and 0.0207. Yet, the
counterfactual based on US state-level data matches pre treatment CO2 emissions slightly
better than the counterfactual based on non-Annex B countries, an observation that gener-
ally holds for all 15 countries under observation. Also the general pattern of counterfactual
emissions in the post treatment period (after 2002), i.e. the CO2 emissions Canada had if it
were not subject to a binding emission target under the KP, is similar for both specifications
and very close to actual CO2 emissions. Again, US state-level data predicts counterfactual
CO2 emissions that slightly better match actual emissions of Canada in the post treatment
period. The treatment effect ranges from -8% to +7% for non-Annex B countries and -1% to
+4% for US state-level data. Note that a positive (negative) number indicates actual emis-
sions are higher (lower) than the emissions of the synthetic control. Thus, a treatment effect
in the sense that countries with a binding emission target under the KP experience lower
actual emissions than predicted by their counterfactuals would result in negative numbers.
As an indicator of significance, the values in parenthesis give the probabilities that if one
randomly draws one country out of the 20 countries in the placebo study (the top 19 non-
treated countries with respect to low RMSPE in the pre-treatment period plus the treated
country) one would draw a country that exhibits at least as high a deviation from their
actual normalized CO2 emissions than the treated country.
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the results for all 15 Annex B countries under investigation and
for the two model specifications (using non-Annex B countries and US states in the donor
pool). The numbers indicate the deviation of the actual normalized CO2 emissions from its
synthetic counterfactuals, i.e. the numbers for Canada are identical to the numbers shown
in Figure 2. Likewise, numbers in parenthesis show probabilities as discussed in Section 2
and, thus, reflect the statistical significance of the effect.16
For the specification using non-Annex B countries to construct counterfactual CO2 emis-
sions (Table 2), we find negative and positive treatment effects ranging from -38% (Portugal
in 2011) to +34% (Norway in 2010). Yet, none of these treatment effects is statistically
significant. When looking at the specification using US state-level data to construct coun-
terfactual CO2 emissions (Table 3), the general pattern is that treatment effects are in a
similar range as for counterfactual emissions based on non-Annex B countries, ranging from
-17% (Belgium in 2007) to +45% (Norway in 2010), but are slightly shifted towards positive
16 Analogous graphs to Figure 2 of actual and counterfactual emissions paths and the corresponding placebo
studies to infer statistical significance for all 15 countries under investigation for the two main specifications
and all robustness checks discussed in this paper are available in the Online Appendix.
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Table 2: Estimates for Treatment Effects based on non-Annex B Countries
Country
Year
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Australia
.04 .11 .00 -.01
(.50) (.40) (.95) (.90)
RMSPE: 0.0330
Austria
.01 .08 .04 .08 .05 -.02 .00 -.02 -.04 -.05
(.90) (.35) (.75) (.65) (.90) (1.0) (1.0) (.95) (.80) (.95)
RMSPE: 0.0681
Belgium
-.07 .00 -.06 -.10 -.10 -.15 -.10 .01 -.05 -.12
(.35) (1.0) (.75) (.60) (.75) (.65) (.85) (1.0) (.80) (.65)
RMSPE: 0.0751
Canada
.07 .04 .06 .04 .05 .03 .01 -.05 -.08
(.40) (.95) (.70) (.90) (.85) (.75) (1.0) (.90) (.80)
RMSPE: 0.0693
Finland
.07 .21 .13 -.08 .12 .04 -.04 -.02 .01 -.10
(.35) (.15) (.50) (.65) (.60) (.90) (.95) (.95) (.95) (.65)
RMSPE: 0.0864
France
-.02 .01 -.02 -.06 -.08 -.13 -.09 -.02 -.17 -.19
(.70) (.95) (.85) (.65) (.75) (.65) (.85) (.95) (.45) (.50)
RMSPE: 0.0982
Germany
-.03 -.00 -.06 -.11 -.10 -.16 -.10 -.00 -.18 -.17
(.65) (1.0) (.75) (.55) (.75) (.60) (.80) (1.0) (.45) (.50)
RMSPE: 0.0966
Great Britain
-.05 -.02 -.05 -.06 -.05 -.10 -.07 -.07 -.13 -.20
(.55) (.80) (.75) (.65) (.90) (.80) (.90) (.90) (.60) (.50)
RMSPE: 0.1338
Italy
-.01 .02 .00 .00 .00 -.03 -.04 -.09 -.13 -.13
(.90) (.80) (.90) (.95) (1.0) (.95) (.95) (.80) (.65) (.60)
RMSPE: 0.0535
Japan
-.00 .01 .00 -.01 -.01 -.02 -.04 -.08 -.09 -.08
(.90) (.95) (.95) (.90) (1.0) (1.0) (.95) (.80) (.70) (.80)
RMSPE: 0.0747
Netherlands
.02 .04 .02 -.02 -.03 -.03 .03 .11 .08 .03
(.70) (.70) (.85) (.85) (.95) (1.0) (.95) (.75) (.70) (.95)
RMSPE: 0.0567
Norway
-.10 .01 -.02 -.04 .01 .02 .17 .15 .34 .08
(.15) (.95) (.85) (.70) (.95) (1.0) (.50) (.65) (.30) (.85)
RMSPE: 0.0882
Portugal
.05 -.07 -.08 -.08 -.20 -.20 -.24 -.24 -.35 -.38
(.50) (.55) (.65) (.65) (.25) (.40) (.30) (.35) (.25) (.25)
RMSPE: 0.0745
Spain
.06 .07 .09 .11 .08 .09 .01 -.06 -.19 -.16
(.35) (.55) (.65) (.55) (.75) (.85) (.95) (.90) (.45) (.50)
RMSPE: 0.0583
Sweden
.12 .10 .04 -.05 -.07 -.14 -.04 .04 -.03 .00
(.15) (.30) (.80) (.65) (.80) (.65) (.95) (.95) (.80) (1.0)
RMSPE: 0.0981
Note: The Table contains treatment effect estimates for each Annex B country under investigation using non-Annex B
countries to construct the synthetic counterfactuals and considering the year of ratification as the time of treatment.
For each country, we display the yearly treatment effects in percent and the respective probabilities of finding such an
effect in parenthesis. Finally, we report the (pre-treatment) RMSPE for each country.
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Table 3: Estimates for Treatment Effects based on US States
Country
Year
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Australia
.07 .17 .07 .09
(.05) (.05) (.20) (.20)
RMSPE: 0.0220
Austria
.04 .12 .11 .14 .12 .03 .04 .04 .11 .10
(.30) (.05) (.10) (.05) (.10) (.75) (.70) (.75) (.30) (.25)
RMSPE: 0.0427
Belgium
-.09 -.04 -.08 -.11 -.12 -.17 -.13 -.05 -.05 -.13
(.05) (.30) (.10) (.10) (.10) (.05) (.10) (.55) (.55) (.15)
RMSPE: 0.0537
Canada
.04 -.01 -.01 .00 -.01 .01 .04 .00 -.00
(.10) (.65) (.55) (.90) (.90) (.90) (.70) (1.0) (.90)
RMSPE: 0.0207
Finland
.08 .19 .17 -.06 .20 .13 .04 .04 .21 .11
(.10) (.05) (.05) (.30) (.05) (.05) (.65) (.75) (.05) (.25)
RMSPE: 0.0670
France
-.03 -.00 .00 -.00 .06 .01 .06 .09 .06 .04
(.30) (.85) (1.0) (.85) (.25) (.85) (.50) (.50) (.50) (.60)
RMSPE: 0.0724
Germany
-.05 .01 -.02 -.02 .15 .08 .17 .09 .08 .12
(.15) (.85) (.45) (.55) (.10) (.30) (.10) (.50) (.45) (.25)
RMSPE: 0.0454
Great Britain
-.04 -.05 -.03 -.06 .00 -.05 -.02 .04 .05 -.03
(.25) (.30) (.20) (.35) (1.0) (.40) (.75) (.80) (.60) (.65)
RMSPE: 0.0298
Italy
.02 .05 .02 .02 .03 .00 .02 -.01 -.03 -.04
(.70) (.30) (.40) (.55) (.50) (.95) (.80) (.85) (.65) (.60)
RMSPE: 0.0238
Japan
.01 .03 .01 -.01 -.03 -.04 -.03 -.07 -.06 -.04
(.95) (.40) (.85) (.75) (.55) (.50) (.75) (.50) (.45) (.60)
RMSPE: 0.0194
Netherlands
.00 .01 .00 -.03 -.07 -.06 .00 .06 .09 .03
(.95) (.65) (1.0) (.55) (.25) (.35) (1.0) (.55) (.35) (.65)
RMSPE: 0.0373
Norway
-.10 .02 -.00 -.01 .04 .04 .20 .26 .45 .21
(.05) (.60) (.90) (.80) (.40) (.70) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05)
RMSPE: 0.0607
Portugal
.15 -.00 -.06 -.07 .02 .04 .02 .04 .00 .06
(.05) (1.0) (.15) (.15) (.85) (.70) (.75) (.65) (.95) (.60)
RMSPE: 0.0803
Spain
.07 .07 .07 .11 .10 .11 .03 -.03 -.11 -.09
(.10) (.15) (.10) (.10) (.10) (.05) (.75) (.80) (.10) (.30)
RMSPE: 0.0297
Sweden
.10 .10 .08 .03 .16 .09 .20 .08 .25 .32
(.05) (.05) (.10) (.55) (.10) (.25) (.05) (.55) (.05) (.05)
RMSPE: 0.0814
Note: The Table contains treatment effect estimates for each Annex B country under investigation using US states
to construct the synthetic counterfactuals and considering the year of ratification as the time of treatment. For each
country, we display the yearly treatment effects in percent and the respective probabilities of finding such an effect in
parenthesis. Finally, we report the (pre-treatment) RMSPE for each country.
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Figure 3: Average actual and synthetic CO2 emissions for synthetic controls based on
a) non-Annex B countries
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Note: The solid line represents the (average) normalized (treatment year=1) CO2 emission of the Annex B countries
under investigation. The dashed line line indicates the average normalized emissions of the synthetic controls for the
treated countries based on non-Annex B countries (left) and US states (right).
treatment effects, in particular for the three Scandinavian countries Finland, Norway and
Sweden. Treatment effects are also more often statistically significant. In fact, we do now
find three statistically significant negative effects: for Belgium in 2002 (-9%) and in 2007
(-17%) and for Norway in 2002 (-10%). In addition, we find positive and significant effects
for Australia (2 years), Austria (2 years), Finland (5 years), Norway (4 years), Portugal (1
year), Spain (1 year) and Sweden (5 years).
In summary, we do not find any evidence that a binding emission target under the KP
induced a significant and persistent emission reduction effect for any of the investigated
Annex B countries with binding emission targets under the KP: For non-Annex B countries
in the donor pool we do not find any statistically significant treatment effects. For coun-
terfactual CO2 emissions paths based on US states we do find significant negative effects
for two countries in one, respectively two years (out of the ten year post treatment period).
However, we also find some significant positive treatment effects, in particular for Finland,
Norway and Sweden. This finding is further illustrated in Figure 3 showing the average
normalized CO2 emissions of the Annex B countries under investigation (solid line) and the
average counterfactual CO2 emissions path (dashed line) based on non-Annex B countries
(left) and US states (right). We observe that the average counterfactual CO2 emissions path
fits the average actual emissions path quite well not only in the pre-treatment but also in
the post treatment period.
When comparing Figures 3 and 1 it is also evident that the synthetic control method suc-
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Table 4: Predictor Imbalance
Variable Diff. original Diff. matched rel. Decrease P-values
Non-Annex B countries
pre-treatment
GDP per capita 7358.8 −2266.9 0.6919 0.27
GDP growth −0.0349 −0.3070 −7.8018 0.15
Agri. value added −6.5614 −0.3813 0.9419 0.42
Ind. value added −3.0797 1.7101 0.4447 0.07
Serv. valued added 9.7223 −1.3421 0.8620 0.23
Pol. rights −2.5251 −0.4555 0.8196 0.00
Polity2 7.9997 1.1811 0.8524 0.00
Human Capital Index 0.3928 −0.3668 0.0662 0.00
Life expectancy 7.0624 3.3051 0.5320 0.00
Population growth −1.1031 −0.7855 0.2880 0.00
post-treatment
Human Capital Index 0.3946 −0.3094 0.2159 0.00
Life expectancy 7.1489 3.6752 0.4859 0.00
Population growth −0.8297 −0.3029 0.6349 0.02
US states
pre-treatment
GDP per capita −0.0049 −0.0065 −0.3184 0.85
GDP growth −1.2045 −0.2353 0.8047 0.16
Population growth 2.4642 0.2712 0.8900 0.60
post-treatment
Population growth 4.9809 1.8151 0.6356 0.10
Note: Average differences (across countries/states and years) between the 15 investigated treated countries and the
two control groups (non-Annex B countries and US States) before matching (Diff. original) and after matching (Diff.
matched). Column (3) shows the relative decrease in the predictor imbalance and column (4) the p-value for the after
matching predictor imbalance to be statistically significant.
cessfully balanced the pre-treatment trends, i.e. the opposing trends between Annex B and
non-Annex B countries, as shown in Figure 1, vanished entirely in Figure 3. Table 4 shows
the imbalance before and after matching for all other predictors. While the predictor imbal-
ance after matching is statistically insignificant for all predictors when using US States as
the control group this is not the case for non-Annex B countries in the donor pool. In fact,
we observe that the SCM successfully matches all economic indicators on a 5% significance
level. However, all other indicators are still significantly different (although it reduces the
imbalance to a large extent). This shows that the selection bias into treatment, i.e. treated
and non-treated countries differ consistently and significantly in important aspects, can only
be mitigated but not completely overcome, as there are irreconcilable structural differences
between Annex B and non-Annex B countries. In this respect US State level data seems to
be preferable to non-Annex B countries in constructing counterfactual CO2 emissions paths.
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5 Robustness Checks
To scrutinize the robustness of our main result that the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol
had no significant effect on the CO2 emissions of 15 major Annex B countries, we run a
series of alternative specifications.
5.1 Timing of treatment
In our main specification we considered the ratification of the KP as the time of treatment.
However, as the emission targets were already known in 1997, it might be that the adoption
of the KP already induced changes in the emission paths of treated countries. In fact, we
consider 1997 as the earliest date at which the KP could have imposed a treatment effect.
As a consequence, we run an additional specification, where we assume 1997 as the year
of treatment. This robustness check could also be interpreted as a placebo in time analysis
(Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003, Abadie et al. 2010, 2015). Results are shown in Tables 9
and 10 in the Appendix and are very similar to our main specification. We do not find any
significant treatment effects using non-Annex B countries in the donor pool and hardly find
any significant negative treatment effects when using US states in the donor pool (Finland in
the year 2000 being the only exception). Again, we do find some positive treatment effects,
in particular for Norway and Spain.
Although an Annex B country might have known its emission reduction target under the
KP already in 1997, a country might not have taken any action to reduce its GHG emis-
sions prior to the date the KP entered into force, even if the country has ratified the KP
before. Of course, this does not invalidate the analysis when choosing ratification or even
adoption as the time of treatment. If the synthetic counterfactual matches the country un-
der consideration well, all we should see is that counterfactual emissions start to deviate
from actual emissions not at the considered time of treatment but at some later time at
which emission reduction efforts started. Yet, taking too early a treatment date comes at the
disadvantage that fewer pre-treatment observations are available to construct the synthetic
counterfactuals which might result in a poorer match between actual country and synthetic
counterfactual. As a consequence, we run an additional specification were we consider 2004
as the time of treatment, because subsequent to Russia’s ratification in November 2004 the
KP entered into force in February 2005. Results are shown in Table 11 in the Appendix and
are consistent with the results of our two main specifications.
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5.2 Alternative dependent variables
For the 15 Annex B countries investigated we do find very little evidence for a persistent
treatment effect, i.e. a permanent reduction in CO2 emissions compared to their synthetic
counterfactuals no matter what date we consider as the time of treatment. One reason for
this might be that CO2 emission levels are strongly correlated with economic performance
and, thus, are vulnerable to business cycle fluctuations. In other words, favorable global
economic conditions for Annex B countries (at least up to 2007) could be responsible for
the lack of a significant effect on emission levels although Annex B countries might have
invested in cleaner production technologies. We test this hypothesis by running alternative
specifications with CO2 intensity (CO2 emissions relative to GDP) and CO2 emissions per
capita as dependent variables, again using non-Annex B country and US state-level data to
construct counterfactuals for the 15 Annex B countries under consideration.17 Tables 12–14
in the Appendix show the results of these alternative model specifications. Our findings are
consistent with our main specifications.
In addition, we run a specification using the emissions of six different GHGs18 measured in
CO2 equivalent emissions instead of CO2 emissions as the dependent variable. In contrast to
CO2 emissions data, emissions data for other GHGs is only available since 1990. Results are
reported in Tables 15 and 16 in the Appendix. Results are highly consistent with our main
specifications. Yet, we observe much fewer positive treatment effects when using US states
to construct counterfactual GHG emissions paths. In particular, the Scandinavian countries
Finland, Norway and Sweden which accounted for most significantly positive treatment
effects in our main specification do not show any significant treatment effects.
5.3 Accounting for Flexibility Mechanisms
In addition to domestic emission reductions, Annex B countries may achieve their emission
targets under the rules of the KP by three flexibility mechanisms (see also Section 1).
Emissions trading (ET) allows Annex B countries to directly trade their initial endowment of
allowed emissions. The general idea of joint implementation (JI) and the clean development
mechanism (CDM) is that a donor country invests in an emission reduction project in a
host country. The donor receives in return additional emission allowances in the amount by
which emissions have been reduced in the host country due to the project. Under JI the
host country is another Annex B country while it is a non-Annex B country under CDM.
ET and JI are redistributions of emission allowances between Annex B countries and do not
17 Due to a discontinuity in US state-level data for GDP between 1997 and 1998 we are not able to use US
states in the donor pool for CO2 intensity.
18 The six GHGs are: CO2, CH4, N2O, Hydrofluorocarbons, Perfluorocarbons, and Sulfur Hexafluoride.
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affect the total cap of all Annex B countries. The CDM creates additional allowances for
Annex B countries. As a consequence, the KP demands that allowances created from CDMs
are additional, i.e. the emissions reductions in the host country would not have occurred
without the investment of the donor country.
The flexible mechanisms of the KP create two potential obstacles for addressing the question
whether and to what extent the adoption of the KP had an influence on the CO2 emissions
of Annex B countries. First, the availability of the flexible mechanisms may crowd out in-
centives of Annex B countries to invest into domestic emissions reductions, in particular
if emissions allowances purchased through the flexible mechanisms are cheaper than corre-
sponding domestic emission reductions. Second, the CDM reduces emissions in non-Annex
B countries. Thus, the CDM blurs the distinction between “treated” and “non-treated”
countries. Of course, the second issue is non-existent when using US states as control group.
To address the first issue, we run an alternative specification, where for each year in the
post treatment period, we replace actual CO2 emissions by CO2 emissions, for which the
country is accountable according to the rules of the KP. To this end, we calculate for
all countries under investigation and for all years in the post treatment period the net
amount of emissions allowances purchased via the three flexible mechanism and deduct it
from the actual CO2 emissions.
19 Thus, in this specification we test whether not actual but
accountable CO2 emissions of countries are significantly different from the CO2 emissions
of their synthetic counterfactuals. To address the second issue, we take advantage of the
fact that only few non-Annex B countries host the vast majority of CDM projects. In fact,
China, India, South Korea, Brazil and Mexico are accountable for more than 85% of all
certified emission reduction units under the CDM.20 As a consequence, we discard these
five countries from the donor pool in the specification where we construct synthetic CO2
emissions by using non-Annex B countries.
The results are shown in Tables 17 and 18 in the Appendix.While we do not find any negative
significant treatment effects for using non-Annex B countries in the donor pool, we do find
four additional significant negative treatment effects in the specification with US states as
control group: Austria in the year 2009 and Great Britain, The Netherlands and Spain in
the year 2011. These four negative treatment effects stem from the fact that net emission
acquisitions are highly volatile. For example, Great Britain had a net acquisition of emission
credits in the year 2011 of 249’462 kt CO2 eq., which amounts to 7.31% of Great Britain’s
19 We convert GHG emission credits into CO2 emission credits by calculating the relative share of CO2
emissions of all GHG emissions for each country and year and multiplying net acquisitions of credits by
this share. Data for GHG emissions and trade in emission credits from the different flexible mechanisms are
reported in the UNFCCC GHG inventories and registries available at http://unfccc.int/national_reports.
20 Numbers are taken from the official CDM website http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Public/CDMinsights.
20
Table 5: Net Acquisition of Emissions Credits for the first KP Commitment Period
Country Initial Allowance Net Acquisition (tot.) Net Acquisition (rel.)
Australia 2’957’579 -97’007 -3.280%
Austria 343’866 73’120 21.264%
Belgium 673’996 -28’523 -4.232%
Canada 2’791’793 331 0.012%
Finland 355’018 7’113 2.003%
France 2’819’627 -97’212 -3.448%
Germany 4’868’097 67’593 1.388%
Great Britain 3’412’081 7’418 0.217%
Italy 2’416’278 67’404 2.790%
Japan 5’928’258 638’201 10.765%
Netherlands 1’001’262 30’660 3.062%
Norway 250’577 35’196 14.046%
Portugal 381’938 25’514 6.680%
Spain 1’666’196 162’184 9.734%
Sweden 375’189 -7’134 -1.901%
Note: The table lists initial greenhouse gas emissions endowments of Annex B countries (Assigned Amount Units) in
kt CO2eq. and the net acquisition of emission credits from all flexible mechanisms in kt CO2eq. and relative to the
initial emissions endowments.
total greenhouse gas emissions allowance under the KP for the first commitment period
from 2008–2012. Yet, as can be seen from Table 5, Great Britain’s total net acquisition for
the whole first commitment period only amounted to 7’418 kt CO2 eq. (0.22% of total GHG
emissions allowance under the KP). In fact, only three countries purchased greenhouse
gas emission credits exceeding 10% of the total initial emission allowance under the KP
(Austria, Japan and Norway) and two additional countries in excess of 5% (Portugal and
Spain). Thus, even taking emission credits from the flexible mechanisms into account we do
not find any significant and robust negative treatment effect for any of the 15 investigated
Annex B countries.
5.4 Omission of Eastern European countries
We excluded Eastern European countries from the analysis for two reasons. First, we have
insufficient data for most of these countries to construct proper synthetic counterfactuals.
Second, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 the whole former “Eastern Block”
experienced a severe economic downturn. Economic downturns are accompanied with lower
production and, as a consequence, lower energy use and reduced CO2 emissions. In fact, the
collapse of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) had a significant impact on these countries’ CO2
emissions that is likely to blur any additional emission reductions due to binding emission
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Figure 4: Poland’s actual and synthetic CO2 emissions for synthetic controls based on
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Note: Actual normalized (1989=1) CO2 emissions (solid line) and synthetic control (dashed line) for Poland considering
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 as the treatment using non-Annex B country data (left) and US state-level data
to construct synthetic counterfactuals. The country weights for the synthetic control are Barbados (0.138), Fiji (0.08),
Korea (0.031), Sri Lanka (0.209), Trinidad and Tobago (0.143), USA (0.193), and Vietnam (0.172) for non-Annex B
countries and Illinois (0.565) and Rhode Island (0.435) for US states in the donor pool.
targets under the KP.21 To show this, we investigate the effect of the treatment “collapse of
the FSU” on the CO2 emissions of Poland.
22 Again, we construct a synthetic counterfactual
Poland (again using non-Annex B countries and US states) and compare the deviations
of normalized CO2 emissions. Figure 4 shows the results. We observe that starting from
the time of the treatment in 1989 actual normalized CO2 emissions in Poland increasingly
fall short of the normalized CO2 emissions of its synthetic counterfactual. We observe no
significant treatment effect for synthetic controls based on non-Annex B countries and a
highly significant treatment effect throughout the whole post treatment period for synthetic
controls based on US states.
5.5 Comparison to DiD approach
Finally, we compare our SCM results to results achieved by a DiD approach (see Table 6).
The most basic DiD specification includes all countries, i.e. all Annex B and non-Annex
B countries with sufficient data availability, and only dummies for Annex B countries and
21 Despite their economic recovery, Eastern European countries exhibited emission levels far below their
emission targets at the time of adoption of the KP in 1997. As these countries were not expected to reach
emission levels at or even above their Kyoto targets in the near future, they had little economic incentives
to reduce emissions (hot air).
22 Poland being one of the few Eastern European countries with sufficient data on CO2 emissions prior to
1990.
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Table 6: Results for Difference-in-Differences Approach
Panel A
Non-Annex B countries US states
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
ATT -0.554 -0.490 -0.460 -0.239 -0.316 0.133 -0.0879 -0.0339 -0.0199 0.105
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.436) (0.028) (0.465) (0.632) (0.202)
N 5875 5875 5323 2131 3239 2380 2715 2163 1891 1412
Panel B
Non-Annex B countries US states
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ATT -0.152 -0.0916 0.00381 0.0281
(0.196) (0.450) (0.925) (0.554)
N 167 156 77 66
Notes: p-values in parenthesis. We employ clustered standard errors in Panel A and robust (Abadie and Imbens 2006,
2008, 2011) standard errors in Panel B. Column 1 of Panel A shows the estimate for the most basic DiD specification
only including a dummy for Annex B countries and for the period after the treatment took place (ratification in 2002)
and their interaction. Instead, column 2 uses standard country and year fixed-effects in addition to the treatment
dummy. Column 3 is identical to column 2 but we restricted the treated sample to the major pollutors also covered
in the SCM analysis. Column 4 is identical to column 3 with all predictors used in the SCM analysis as covariates.
In Column 5 we added only those variables used in our SCM analysis that can be treated as being unaffected by
the treatment, i.e. life expectancy, population growth and the human capital index (otherwise identical to column 3).
Finally, in column 6 we restricted the control group to have the same pre-treatment range of average CO2 emission
trends, i.e. average year-to-year emission changes of the control group are above the minimum of the 15 Annex B
countries and below the maximum (otherwise identical to column 4). Estimates in columns 7–10 are based on the
dataset that uses US states as the control group. Columns 7, 8, 9 and 10 are the equivalent of columns 2, 3, 5, and 6
of Panel A when using US state level data. In columns 1 and 2 of Panel B we show propensity score matching based
DiD results for the full sample (1) and for the major polluters (2). Columns 3 and 4 of Panel B are the equivalent of
columns 1 and 2 when using US state level data.
the post treatment period (assuming ratification in 2002 as the treatment event) and their
interaction. The results of this interaction term on log CO2 emissions are reported in column
(1) in Panel A of Table (6). We find a statistically highly significant negative treatment
effect of -55.4%. In column (2) we also include country and year fixed-effects, resulting in a
highly significant and slightly smaller negative treatment effect of -49.0%. In column (3) we
restrict attention to the 15 treated countries that we analyze with the SCM. Again, we find
a highly significant and large negative treatment effect of -46.0%. In column (4) we add all
the predictors that we use in the SCM analysis as covariates, rendering a highly significant
negative treatment effect of -23.9%. As some of these covariates may constitute bad controls
(see also Section 2), we only include life expectancy, population growth, the human capital
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index, the freedom house and the polity2 index in column (5), as we consider them safe from
being influenced by the treatment itself. We find a highly significant negative treatment
effect of -31.6%. Finally, in column (6) we account for the violation of the common trend
hypothesis by restricting the control group to have the same pre-treatment range of average
CO2 emission trends as the 15 treated countries (otherwise the specification is identical to
column (5)) and find a non-significant positive treatment effect of 13.3%.
In columns (7)–(10) of Panel A we report DiD results when using US states as the control
group. Column (7) corresponds to column (2), i.e. apart from dummies for treated coun-
tries and the post treatment period, we only include country (respectively state) and year
fixed-effects. We find a significant (on the 5% level) treatment effect of -8.8%. Restricting
the analysis to the 15 countries analyzed with the SCM results in a non-significant negative
treatment effect of -3.4%. Controlling, in addition, for all covariates that are not even po-
tentially influenced by the treatment, results in a non-significant negative treatment effect
of -2.0%. Finally, restricting the control group to the same pre-treatment range of average
CO2 emission trends as the 15 treated countries to account for the violation of the common
trend hypothesis yields an insignificant positive treatment effect of 10.5%.
Using average pre treatment CO2 emissions as the only predictor, we show in Panel B of
Table 6 propensity score matching based DiD results for all Annex B countries (columns
(1) and (3)) and for the 15 countries analyzed with SCM (columns (2) and (4)), when using
non-Annex B countries (columns (1) and (2)) and US states (columns (3) and (4)) as the
control group. We find non-significant negative treatments effects for non-Annex B and and
non-significant positive treatment effects for US states as the control group.
In summary, we find that the DiD approach may easily generate large and significant treat-
ment effects. However, these are artifacts of the violated common trend assumption. Taking
measures to control for the different pre treatment CO2 emission trends renders the treat-
ment effects insignificant.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
The KP has been widely criticized by the public press and the scientific community alike.
In particular, issues concerning equity, efficiency and cost-effectiveness have been raised.
In this paper, we asked in how far the KP lived up to its primary goal, the reduction of
domestic GHG emissions in the industrialized world. To answer this question, we analyzed
the development of CO2 emissions for major GHG emitters with binding emission targets
under the KP by employing the synthetic control method. We find very little evidence for
a significant emission reduction effect for all 15 investigated countries, i.e. countries with
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binding emissions targets did not emit less CO2 over the period from 1998–2011 than they
would have had in the absence of the GHG emission targets.
Yet, we do find some evidence that some Annex B countries performed even worse than
comparable countries from the two donor pools. On average, the CO2 emissions of the
15 countries are rather above than below their synthetic controls when using US states
as the control group (see Figure 3). This is particularly puzzling, as the violation of the
SUTVA (see Section 1) should rather bias our results in the direction of negative significance.
However, these positive treatment effects are restricted to very few countries. In fact, the
three Scandinavian countries Finland, Norway and Sweden are responsible for the vast
majority of significant positive treatment effects in our main specifications (14 out of 20)
and in almost all robustness checks. In addition, these countries (like other small countries)
show highly volatile CO2 emission paths which makes the construction of counterfactual
emission paths difficult.23 This conjecture is supported by the robustness check in which we
use GHG instead of CO2 emissions. Our GHG emission data show much lower year to year
variations than our CO2 data, in particular for the three Scandinavian countries. In this
specification these countries do not exhibit any positive treatment effects.
Our results show the importance of addressing a number of empirical challenges when esti-
mating the effect of international environmental policies in general, and the KP in particular.
The key to identifying the “true” treatment effect is the availability and the selection of ap-
propriate controls. In order to do so, our empirical strategy differs from previous studies in
three important aspects:
First, we employ the synthetic control method (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003, Abadie et al.
2010, 2015), which enables us to construct counterfactual emissions paths for all 15 countries
under investigation that reasonably match the observed emissions in the pre-treatment
period. This is possible because the treatment effects can be estimated for each country
individually, which allows to individually identify the counterfactual synthetic country to
the idiosyncrasies of each treated country, such as different country characteristics, emission
paths, targets and ratification dates.
Second, using non-Annex B country data to construct counterfactual CO2 emission paths
for the investigated Annex B countries may be problematic because of (i) irreconcilable
structural differences between Annex B and non-Annex B countries including opposing pre-
treatment emission paths and (ii) a bias resulting from the use of the flexibility mechanisms
blurring the distinction between treated and non-treated countries. To circumvent these
problems we run a second specification using US state-level data to construct synthetic
counterfactuals. Although US state-level data comes at the disadvantage that data on some
23 Obviously, this not just a problem for the SCM but for any econometric method.
25
covariates is not available, it seems to be preferable to using non-Annex B country data
on the ground that (i) the imbalance in predictors is much smaller and, as a result, (ii)
pre-treatment matching is considerably better.
Third, we discard all Eastern European countries from the analysis. We consider this justi-
fied, as the former “Eastern Block” experienced a severe economic downturn after the col-
lapse of the Former Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s. Even after their economic
recovery, former CO2 emission levels were not reached and, at the time of the adoption of
the KP, it was evident that many Eastern European countries were unlikely to reach or
even exceed their GHG emission targets (also known as “hot air”). As a consequence, these
countries had no incentive to reduce GHG emissions in the first place. Nevertheless, the
collapse of the FSU had a significant negative impact on the CO2 emissions of the Eastern
European countries. Incorporating these countries into the treated sample when eliciting the
average treatment effect of the treated may bias the result in favor of a negative significant
effect if one is not able to control for the peculiarities of those countries in particular with
respect to the development of CO2 emission in the early 90s.
We believe that the empirical challenges faced in the present paper apply to many inter-
national environmental policies that can only be evaluated at the country level. Countries
tend to be highly heterogeneous with significant differences in their (socio-)economic and
political characteristics. As a result, there are numerous issues that need to be addressed,
as discussed in Sections 1 and 2. Accounting for all of these challenges simultaneously can
be difficult when employing standard panel data analysis. The synthetic control method or
extensions of matching based DiD methods may be better suited to address these challenges
than standard panel data approaches.
Finally, our results have important political implications. In December 2015 the UNFCCC
managed to reach a consensus on the “Paris Agreement” that outlines the main pillars of the
successor of the KP which is to become effective by 2020. In the Paris Agreement reduction
targets are called “nationally determined contributions”. Like the KP, the Paris Agreement
is lacking (so far) any enforcement mechanism for non-compliance. According to our results,
the KP had no verifiable effect on the CO2 emissions of ratifying Annex B countries. As a
consequence, we are pessimistic that the Paris Agreement, which rests on similar principles,
will have any discernible effect on the reduction of global GHG emissions.24 In fact, bilateral
or smaller multilateral emission reduction agreements, where commitment is in the best
24 Note, however, that the present analysis focuses on national emission reductions from the date of ratifica-
tion of the KP to 2011 which approximately covers the first commitment period (2008–2012). That is, we
cannot rule out that there may be emission reduction effects after 2011 nor can we rule out sub-national or
sectoral effects, as we focus on the question whether Kyoto emission targets led to a reduction in national
GHG emissions of Annex B countries.
26
interest of all participating countries, may be more effective in reducing GHG emissions
(e.g., Carbone et al. 2009).
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A.1 Ratification of the KP as the treatment event
Table 7: Weights for using non-Annex B countries in the donor pool
Australia: Chile (0.114), Ecuador (0.040), Malaysia (0.056), Panama (0.077), Singapore (0.002), USA (0.711)
Austria: Gabon (0.031), South Korea (0.197), Thailand (0.032), USA (0.740)
Belgium: Gabon (0.052), USA (0.948)
Canada: China (0.017), South Korea (0.207), Singapore (0.029) USA (0.747)
Finland: China (0.021), Gabon (0.057), South Korea (0.220), USA (0.702)
France: Colombia (0.153), Gabon (0.113), Mexico (0.045), Mauritius (0.106), USA (0.584)
Germany: Brazil (0.057), Gabon (0.131), Mexico (0.112), USA (0.701)
Great Britain: Gabon (0.047), South Korea (0.144), USA (0.809),
Italy: China (0.014), Gabon (0.012), South Korea (0.126), USA (0.848)
Japan: Gabon (0.019), South Korea (0.335), USA (0.645)
Netherlands: Gabon (0.051), South Korea (0.045), USA (0.904)
Norway: Gabon (0.008), Thailand (0.137), USA (0.855)
Portugal: Brazil (0.199), Mauritius (0.394), Thailand (0.203), USA (0.205)
Spain: Fiji (0.073), South Korea (0.148), Mauritius (0.202), USA (0.577)
Sweden: Gabon (0.158), Mexico (0.058), Mauritius (0.018), USA (0.766)
Note: Country Weights for Results in Table 2. The countries in the donor pool, i.e. countries that may receive positive
weights, include all non-Annex B countries with sufficient data except for countries classified as low income and
lower-middle income according to the World Bank. More specifically, the donor pool/control group consists of (ISO 3
country codes): BRA, BWA, CHL, CHN, COL, DOM, ECU, FJI, GAB, JOR, KOR, MEX, MUS, MYS, PAN, SAU,
SGP, THA, TUN, TUR, USA, VEN, and ZAF.
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Table 8: Weights for using US states in the Donor Pool
Australia: Alaska (0.007), Arizona (0.133), Georgia (0.217), Hawaii (0.042), Louisiana (0.177), Nebraska (0.020),
New Hampshire (0.014), North Carolina (0.036), South Carolina (0.0190), Utah (0.335), Wyoming (0.001)
Austria: California (0.149), Delaware (0.250), Mississippi (0.069), Ohio (0.012), Oregon (0.161), Rhode Island (0.094),
South Dakota (0.220), Wyoming (0.044)
Belgium: California (0.030), Hawaii (0.034), Illinois (0.055), Louisiana (0.278), Ohio (0.602)
Canada: Alaska (0.003), Arizona (0.131), California (0.021), Delaware (0.107), Hawaii (0.120), Illinois (0.201),
Louisiana (0.048), Mississippi (0.0190), Nevada (0.165), Oregon (0.080), South Carolina (0.104), Wyoming (0.001)
Finland: California (0.199), Massachusetts (0.280), New Hampshire (0.103), Ohio (0.260), Rhode Island (0.158)
France: Delaware (0.077), District of Columbia (0.372), Illinois (0.108), Ohio (0.443)
Germany: District of Columbia (0.829), Ohio (0.171)
Great Britain: Delaware (0.292), District of Columbia (0.035), Massachusetts (0.225), Ohio (0.450)
Italy: California (0.054), Connecticut (0.274), Delaware (0.127), Hawaii (0.026), Idaho (0.299), Louisiana (0.124),
Mississippi (0.002), South Dakota (0.093)
Japan: Hawaii (0.089), Idaho (0.272), Louisiana (0.323), Montana (0.007), New York (0.014), North Dakota (0.068),
Oklahoma (0.002), Oregon (0.029), Rhode Island (0.054), South Dakota (0.075), Utah (0.046), Wyoming (0.021)
Netherlands: California (0.218), Hawaii (0.092), Louisiana (0.314), North Dakota (0.002), Ohio (0.372), Wyoming (0.001)
Norway: Arizona (0.218), District of Columbia (0.034), Maryland (0.139), Mississippi (0.268), New Hampshire (0.053),
West Virginia (0.288)
Portugal: Nevada (1.0)
Spain: Arizona (0.492), Idaho (0.049), Mississippi (0.058), Missouri (0.253), Nevada (0.070), Oregon (0.046),
South Dakota (0.032)
Sweden: District of Columbia (0.768), Ohio (0.232)
Note: US state weights for results in Table 3. All US states are included in the donor pool, i.e. may receive positive
weights.
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A.2 Adoption of the KP as the treatment event




1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Australia
.01 -.08 -.11 -.13 -.09 -.09 -.10 -.08 -.07 -.08 -.05 .02 -.08 -.07
(.90) (.50) (.30) (.45) (.40) (.50) (.50) (.60) (.65) (.65) (.80) (.95) (.70) (.70)
RMSPE: 0.0254
Austria
.02 -.05 -.09 -.08 -.04 .02 -.03 -.03 -.07 -.10 -.08 -.10 -.10 -.10
(.90) (.75) (.40) (.50) (.80) (.85) (.75) (.80) (.75) (.60) (.65) (.65) (.65) (.65)
RMSPE: 0.0582
Belgium
.03 -.03 -.07 -.10 -.12 -.07 -.16 -.21 -.22 -.23 -.19 -.11 -.16 -.22
(.80) (.75) (.55) (.45) (.40) (.55) (.35) (.30) (.35) (.35) (.50) (.65) (.45) (.45)
RMSPE: 0.0965
Canada
.03 .01 .03 .01 -.02 .03 .01 .01 .01 .01 .00 -.01 -.07 -.09
(.75) (.95) (.70) (.95) (.85) (.85) (.90) (.90) (.95) (1.0) (.95) (1.0) (.80) (.65)
RMSPE: 0.0260
Finland
-.07 -.12 -.19 -.15 -.05 .08 -.00 -.21 -.04 -.09 -.20 -.19 -.15 -.26
(.55) (.35) (.20) (.40) (.70) (.50) (1.0) (.30) (.85) (.65) (.40) (.50) (.45) (.40)
RMSPE: 0.0888
France
.12 -.02 -.07 -.08 -.03 -.02 -.10 -.15 -.16 -.16 -.11 -.03 -.17 -.20
(.20) (.90) (.55) (.45) (.80) (.85) (.50) (.45) (.40) (.50) (.60) (.95) (.45) (.50)
RMSPE: 0.1737
Germany
.05 .02 .04 .01 -.04 -.04 -.10 -.15 -.14 -.19 -.14 -.10 -.23 -.25
(.70) (.95) (.70) (1.0) (.80) (.75) (.50) (.50) (.50) (.40) (.55) (.70) (.45) (.40)
RMSPE: 0.1546
Great Britain
.01 -.01 .01 -.01 -.07 -.06 -.08 -.11 -.09 -.14 -.11 -.12 -.18 -.25
(.90) (1.0) (.95) (.95) (.60) (.70) (.55) (.60) (.60) (.50) (.65) (.65) (.45) (.40)
RMSPE: 0.1087
Italy
.01 -.03 -.05 -.08 -.04 -.02 -.07 -.10 -.11 -.11 -.11 -.13 -.20 -.19
(.90) (.75) (.60) (.50) (.80) (.85) (.55) (.60) (.50) (.60) (.60) (.60) (.45) (.50)
RMSPE: 0.0440
Japan
-.03 -.03 -.04 -.07 -.08 -.07 -.06 -.08 -.07 -.08 -.11 -.16 -.16 -.14
(.80) (.80) (.65) (.65) (.40) (.55) (.60) (.65) (.75) (.70) (.60) (.55) (.45) (.50)
RMSPE: 0.0726
Netherlands
-.04 -.10 -.11 -.13 -.08 -.07 -.10 -.17 -.18 -.15 -.10 -.05 -.08 -.12
(.70) (.45) (.30) (.45) (.45) (.55) (.50) (.45) (.40) (.50) (.60) (.95) (.70) (.55)
RMSPE: 0.0538
Norway
.10 .23 .14 .20 .09 .24 .20 .18 .25 .24 .45 .49 .66 .36
(.25) (.25) (.30) (.25) (.40) (.25) (.25) (.45) (.35) (.35) (.25) (.20) (.15) (.40)
RMSPE: 0.0756
Portugal
.02 .04 -.08 -.13 -.07 -.18 -.18 -.20 -.33 -.32 -.35 -.34 -.44 -.44
(.80) (.75) (.40) (.35) (.40) (.25) (.25) (.30) (.15) (.15) (.15) (.20) (.15) (.15)
RMSPE: 0.0516
Spain
.03 .06 .04 .03 .10 .10 .12 .12 .09 .11 .04 -.04 -.16 -.13
(.80) (.60) (.70) (.85) (.40) (.45) (.35) (.50) (.50) (.60) (.80) (.95) (.45) (.50)
RMSPE: 0.1025
Sweden
.10 .03 -.02 -.07 .11 .07 -.04 -.15 -.17 -.18 -.10 -.06 -.09 -.06
(.40) (.85) (.80) (.65) (.40) (.55) (.70) (.50) (.40) (.45) (.65) (.95) (.70) (.85)
RMSPE: 0.2002
Note: The Table contains treatment effect estimates for each Annex B country under investigation using non-Annex
B countries to construct the synthetic counterfactuals and considering the year 1997 (the year of adoption of the
KP) as the time of treatment. For each country, we display the yearly treatment effects in percent and the respective
probabilities of finding such an effect in parenthesis. Finally, we report the (pre-treatment) RMSPE for each country.
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Table 10: Treatment in 1997: Estimates for Treatment Effects based on US states
Country
Year
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Australia
.02 -.04 -.05 -.06 .01 .01 -.02 .01 .05 .05 .11 .19 .12 .14
(.60) (.30) (.30) (.35) (.80) (.85) (.75) (.75) (.45) (.70) (.30) (.10) (.35) (.30)
RMSPE: 0.0207
Austria
-.02 -.07 -.05 .00 .05 .12 .10 .12 .13 .04 .06 .07 .15 .15
(.60) (.15) (.35) (1.0) (.45) (.20) (.30) (.20) (.25) (.85) (.50) (.75) (.30) (.30)
RMSPE: 0.0435
Belgium
.04 .01 -.02 .02 -.07 -.03 -.05 -.09 -.10 -.15 -.11 -.01 -.02 -.08
(.25) (.65) (.65) (.80) (.30) (.70) (.35) (.35) (.30) (.25) (.30) (.90) (.95) (.50)
RMSPE: 0.0576
Canada
.09 .07 .05 .09 .06 .11 .07 .08 .05 .05 .06 .12 .05 .02
(.05) (.15) (.35) (.35) (.35) (.20) (.35) (.35) (.50) (.65) (.50) (.35) (.70) (.90)
RMSPE: 0.0172
Finland
-.05 -.07 -.13 -.04 .02 .08 .05 -.15 .09 .04 -.05 -.04 .12 .02
(.15) (.20) (.05) (.40) (.60) (.30) (.35) (.10) (.30) (.75) (.80) (.90) (.50) (.90)
RMSPE: 0.0642
France
.10 -.00 -.06 .04 .00 .05 .05 .06 .16 .11 .17 .16 .13 .12
(.05) (.90) (.30) (.40) (.95) (.45) (.35) (.45) (.25) (.30) (.25) (.30) (.40) (.40)
RMSPE: 0.0792
Germany
.01 -.02 -.06 .01 -.04 .03 .00 -.00 .19 .12 .23 .13 .11 .16
(.65) (.50) (.25) (.85) (.45) (.70) (1.0) (.90) (.20) (.30) (.15) (.50) (.55) (.30)
RMSPE: 0.0473
Great Britain
-.00 -.03 -.04 .01 -.03 -.00 -.01 -.02 .07 -.00 .04 .07 .10 .02
(.90) (.45) (.40) (.90) (.55) (.90) (.85) (.70) (.40) (1.0) (.85) (.80) (.55) (.90)
RMSPE: 0.0329
Italy
-.03 -.06 -.01 -.01 -.00 .02 .01 -.00 .02 -.03 .00 -.05 -.04 -.03
(.45) (.20) (.80) (.85) (.95) (.75) (.85) (.90) (.85) (.95) (1.0) (.80) (.75) (.70)
RMSPE: 0.0241
Japan
-.05 -.07 -.08 -.09 -.06 -.02 -.06 -.09 -.09 -.11 -.09 -.14 -.12 -.09
(.15) (.20) (.10) (.35) (.35) (.75) (.35) (.35) (.25) (.25) (.30) (.25) (.30) (.40)
RMSPE: 0.0254
Netherlands
-.03 -.07 -.09 -.04 -.02 -.01 -.02 -.05 -.08 -.08 -.03 .02 .06 .02
(.40) (.20) (.10) (.40) (.60) (.85) (.65) (.50) (.35) (.40) (.90) (.90) (.70) (.90)
RMSPE: 0.0373
Norway
.06 .19 .09 .20 .05 .19 .17 .18 .31 .32 .55 .57 .86 .55
(.10) (.05) (.10) (.10) (.45) (.05) (.10) (.10) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05)
RMSPE: 0.0535
Portugal
.05 .21 .19 .20 .30 .19 .22 .23 .12 .11 .09 .11 .03 -.03
(.15) (.05) (.05) (.10) (.05) (.05) (.10) (.10) (.25) (.25) (.30) (.35) (.85) (.75)
RMSPE: 0.0723
Spain
.00 .05 .10 .12 .19 .19 .24 .30 .29 .28 .17 .07 -.02 .01
(.95) (.20) (.10) (.25) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.10) (.60) (.90) (.90)
RMSPE: 0.0295
Sweden
.04 .01 -.06 .01 .11 .12 .09 .05 .19 .12 .25 .10 .28 .35
(.20) (.85) (.25) (.85) (.20) (.25) (.30) (.50) (.20) (.25) (.10) (.60) (.10) (.05)
RMSPE: 0.0882
Note: The Table contains treatment effect estimates for each Annex B country under investigation using US states to
construct the synthetic counterfactuals and considering the year 1997 (the year of adoption of the KP) as the time
of treatment. For each country, we display the yearly treatment effects in percent and the respective probabilities of
finding such an effect in parenthesis. Finally, we report the (pre-treatment) RMSPE for each country.
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A.3 KP’s entering into force as the treatment event
Table 11: Treatment in 2004: Estimates for Treatment Effects based on non-Annex B Coun-
tries (left) and US states (right)
Country
non-Annex B countries US states
Year Year
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Australia
.03 .05 .04 .09 .18 .12 .11 .03 .06 .07 .12 .23 .14 .13
(.70) (.65) (.85) (.65) (.40) (.55) (.60) (.25) (.15) (.20) (.10) (.05) (.05) (.10)
RMSPE: 0.0330 RMSPE: 0.0222
Austria
.01 -.02 -.07 -.10 -.13 -.09 -.10 .03 .00 -.05 -.02 -.01 .03 .02
(1.0) (.80) (.65) (.60) (.50) (.65) (.65) (.25) (.95) (.35) (.65) (.85) (.80) (.85)
RMSPE: 0.0587 RMSPE: 0.0392
Belgium
-.04 -.08 -.09 -.11 -.06 -.01 -.15 -.04 -.00 -.06 -.02 .05 .06 -.00
(.55) (.45) (.55) (.55) (.80) (.95) (.50) (.20) (.95) (.25) (.70) (.55) (.55) (1.0)
RMSPE: 0.0847 RMSPE: 0.0593
Canada
.00 -.01 -.01 -.03 -.03 -.08 -.09 .00 -.03 -.04 -.01 -.01 -.06 -.06
(1.0) (.90) (.90) (.85) (.95) (.70) (.85) (.75) (.45) (.50) (.85) (.85) (.55) (.40)
RMSPE: 0.0330 RMSPE: 0.0185
Finland
-.20 -.02 -.10 -.20 -.22 -.12 -.20 -.18 .06 .03 -.07 -.03 .12 .03
(.05) (.80) (.50) (.20) (.35) (.50) (.30) (.05) (.15) (.65) (.20) (.85) (.20) (.75)
RMSPE: 0.0726 RMSPE: 0.0541
France
-.02 -.06 -.05 -.10 -.05 -.06 -.16 -.00 .06 .02 .06 .08 .06 .03
(.70) (.50) (.75) (.60) (.80) (.75) (.45) (.90) (.15) (.80) (.25) (.30) (.70) (.75)
RMSPE: 0.0978 RMSPE: 0.0669
Germany
-.06 -.04 -.08 -.03 .01 -.09 -.11 -.00 .19 .12 .23 .13 .11 .16
(.35) (.70) (.60) (.85) (1.0) (.65) (.60) (.90) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.10) (.20) (.15)
RMSPE: 0.1516 RMSPE: 0.0453
Great Britain
-.02 -.04 -.03 -.07 -.10 -.08 -.20 -.02 .06 -.01 .03 .10 .12 .03
(.70) (.80) (.85) (.75) (.65) (.70) (.35) (.40) (.15) (.95) (.60) (.25) (.20) (.80)
RMSPE: 0.0862 RMSPE: 0.0286
Italy
-.03 -.05 -.05 -.15 -.19 -.18 -.21 -.00 -.00 -.04 -.03 -.04 -.07 -.07
(.65) (.65) (.75) (.30) (.40) (.45) (.30) (1.0) (1.0) (.50) (.65) (.65) (.50) (.35)
RMSPE: 0.0424 RMSPE: 0.0183
Japan
-.04 -.04 -.03 -.06 -.10 -.04 -.04 -.02 -.03 -.04 -.04 -.09 -.06 -.04
(.55) (.75) (.90) (.75) (.60) (.75) (.90) (.40) (.40) (.35) (.35) (.20) (.55) (.65)
RMSPE: 0.0410 RMSPE: 0.0165
Netherlands
-.04 -.08 -.06 -.06 -.02 .04 -.05 -.03 -.06 -.06 .01 .07 .10 .04
(.55) (.45) (.70) (.75) (1.0) (.75) (.90) (.25) (.15) (.25) (.80) (.35) (.20) (.65)
RMSPE: 0.0516 RMSPE: 0.0343
Norway
-.01 .04 .05 .20 .19 .41 .14 -.01 .04 .04 .20 .29 .49 .23
(.85) (.70) (.75) (.25) (.40) (.25) (.55) (.70) (.30) (.35) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05)
RMSPE: 0.0775 RMSPE: 0.0579
Portugal
-.01 -.17 -.14 -.25 -.23 -.27 -.33 -.01 .03 .05 .03 .06 .01 .03
(.95) (.10) (.40) (.05) (.35) (.30) (.25) (.75) (.40) (.30) (.65) (.55) (.85) (.75)
RMSPE: 0.0515 RMSPE: 0.0747
Spain
.03 -.02 -.09 -.15 -.22 -.29 -.27 .04 .02 .03 -.05 -.09 -.16 -.14
(.70) (.80) (.55) (.30) (.35) (.25) (.25) (.20) (.70) (.65) (.25) (.20) (.05) (.10)
RMSPE: 0.0616 RMSPE: 0.0337
Sweden
-.08 -.10 -.10 -.06 -.11 .05 .01 -.06 .01 -.05 .03 -.05 .10 .15
(.30) (.35) (.55) (.75) (.60) (.75) (1.0) (.15) (.90) (.50) (.65) (.65) (.20) (.10)
RMSPE: 0.1333 RMSPE: 0.0750
Note: The Table contains treatment effect estimates for each Annex B country under investigation using non-Annex
B countries and US states to construct the synthetic counterfactuals and considering the year 2004 (when the KP
entered into force) as the time of treatment. For each country, we display the yearly treatment effects in percent and
the respective probabilities of finding such an effect in parenthesis. Finally, we report the (pre-treatment) RMSPE for
each country.
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A.4 CO2 intensity as dependent variable
Table 12: Estimates for Treatment Effects (CO2 per GDP) based on non-Annex B Countries
Country
Year
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Australia
.07 .06 .00 .02
(.25) (.80) (1.0) (.85)
RMSPE: 0.0760
Austria
.01 .11 .09 .14 .12 .08 .09 .05 .04 .05
(.95) (.30) (.50) (.50) (.60) (.75) (.85) (.85) (.95) (.85)
RMSPE: 0.1019
Belgium
-.08 .01 -.02 -.06 .01 -.03 .01 .07 .00 -.02
(.30) (.90) (.95) (.75) (.95) (.90) (.95) (.80) (1.0) (.95)
RMSPE: 0.0926
Canada
.06 .03 .03 -.01 -.01 -.02 -.01 -.10 -.10
(.45) (.75) (.80) (1.0) (.95) (.90) (.95) (.55) (.60)
RMSPE: 0.0760
Finland
.08 .23 .16 -.06 .17 .08 -.05 -.03 .10 -.00
(.25) (.15) (.20) (.75) (.35) (.75) (.95) (.90) (.70) (1.0)
RMSPE: 0.1536
France
-.01 .09 .08 .07 .07 .00 .05 .15 .00 -.00
(.95) (.50) (.55) (.75) (.80) (1.0) (.95) (.65) (1.0) (1.0)
RMSPE: 0.1442
Germany
-.00 .04 -.00 -.03 -.01 -.10 -.04 .17 -.13 -.09
(1.0) (.80) (.95) (.90) (.95) (.70) (.95) (.65) (.65) (.75)
RMSPE: 0.2135
Great Britain
-.02 .03 -.00 .00 .04 .00 .07 .13 -.02 -.04
(.80) (.90) (.95) (1.0) (.85) (1.0) (.90) (.70) (1.0) (.85)
RMSPE: 0.1951
Italy
.06 .13 .15 .17 .17 .11 .07 .02 .02 .02
(.30) (.30) (.20) (.35) (.40) (.70) (.90) (.95) (1.0) (.95)
RMSPE: 0.0568
Japan
.03 .05 .05 .07 .09 .08 .06 .05 .03 .06
(.70) (.80) (.70) (.75) (.65) (.75) (.95) (.80) (.95) (.80)
RMSPE: 0.0767
Netherlands
.04 .11 .11 .01 .01 -.01 .06 .20 .08 .09
(.55) (.35) (.35) (.95) (.95) (1.0) (.90) (.40) (.80) (.75)
RMSPE: 0.1505
Norway
-.05 .12 .05 .07 .15 .16 .46 .31 .49 .38
(.45) (.30) (.70) (.75) (.45) (.45) (.15) (.20) (.05) (.20)
RMSPE: 0.1035
Portugal
.07 -.00 .03 .02 -.07 -.05 -.08 -.10 -.19 -.20
(.30) (1.0) (.80) (.95) (.70) (.75) (.85) (.70) (.50) (.45)
RMSPE: 0.0904
Spain
.03 .07 .11 .13 .09 .05 -.03 -.12 -.18 -.15
(.65) (.60) (.30) (.50) (.65) (.75) (.95) (.65) (.50) (.50)
RMSPE: 0.0856
Sweden
.13 .12 .06 .04 .01 -.08 .02 .17 .02 .09
(.20) (.30) (.70) (.90) (.95) (.75) (.95) (.65) (.95) (.70)
RMSPE: 0.2093
Note: The Table contains treatment effect estimates for CO2 emissions per GDP for each Annex B country under
investigation using non-Annex B countries to construct the synthetic counterfactuals and considering the year of
ratification as the time of treatment. For each country, we display the yearly treatment effects in percent and the
respective probabilities of finding such an effect in parenthesis. Finally, we report the (pre-treatment) RMSPE for
each country.
35
A.5 CO2 per capita as dependent variable




2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Australia
.04 .11 .00 -.02
(.50) (.35) (.95) (.80)
RMSPE: 0.0340
Austria
.01 .08 .05 .09 .06 .00 .01 -.03 -.01 -.03
(.80) (.40) (.80) (.65) (.95) (1.0) (.95) (1.0) (.85) (.90)
RMSPE: 0.0570
Belgium
-.06 .00 -.05 -.08 -.08 -.12 -.09 -.01 -.03 -.11
(.35) (1.0) (.75) (.65) (.90) (.75) (.85) (1.0) (.80) (.60)
RMSPE: 0.0592
Canada
.04 .02 .02 .03 .04 .08 .03 -.02 .00
(.70) (.85) (1.0) (.90) (.90) (.85) (.95) (1.0) (1.0)
RMSPE: 0.0483
Finland
.07 .22 .16 -.05 .16 .09 -.01 -.01 .05 -.06
(.30) (.15) (.40) (.75) (.40) (.85) (1.0) (1.0) (.65) (.75)
RMSPE: 0.0838
France
-.01 .01 -.00 -.03 -.05 -.09 -.08 -.06 -.13 -.15
(.80) (1.0) (1.0) (.80) (.95) (.85) (.85) (.90) (.45) (.50)
RMSPE: 0.0848
Germany
-.02 -.00 -.04 -.08 -.06 -.10 -.06 -.02 -.11 -.10
(.70) (1.0) (.85) (.65) (.95) (.80) (.90) (1.0) (.50) (.60)
RMSPE: 0.0930
Great Britain
-.04 -.02 -.04 -.04 -.02 -.07 -.05 -.07 -.11 -.18
(.60) (.85) (.85) (.75) (.95) (.90) (.95) (.85) (.50) (.45)
RMSPE: 0.0776
Italy
-.01 .02 .01 .02 .02 -.02 -.04 -.10 -.13 -.14
(.80) (.75) (1.0) (.85) (.95) (.90) (.95) (.65) (.45) (.55)
RMSPE: 0.0329
Japan
-.00 .02 .02 .02 .02 .01 -.01 -.05 -.06 -.04
(1.0) (.80) (.95) (.85) (.95) (.95) (1.0) (.90) (.65) (.80)
RMSPE: 0.0559
Netherlands
.02 .04 .03 .00 -.01 -.00 .05 .11 .12 .06
(.75) (.65) (.85) (1.0) (.95) (1.0) (.95) (.65) (.50) (.75)
RMSPE: 0.0561
Norway
-.10 .02 -.01 -.02 .03 .03 .17 .13 .32 .07
(.15) (.85) (1.0) (.90) (.95) (.90) (.45) (.60) (.25) (.75)
RMSPE: 0.0917
Portugal
.06 -.05 -.04 -.03 -.16 -.15 -.19 -.17 -.28 -.30
(.35) (.60) (.85) (.80) (.35) (.50) (.35) (.30) (.25) (.25)
RMSPE: 0.0583
Spain
.04 .04 .06 .08 .03 .02 -.06 -.14 -.24 -.23
(.60) (.70) (.65) (.65) (.95) (.90) (.90) (.50) (.25) (.40)
RMSPE: 0.0532
Sweden
.12 .09 .05 -.02 -.04 -.09 -.03 -.04 .04 .07
(.15) (.40) (.75) (.90) (.95) (.85) (.95) (1.0) (.75) (.75)
RMSPE: 0.0909
Note: The Table contains treatment effect estimates for CO2 emissions per capita for each Annex B country under
investigation using non-Annex B countries to construct the synthetic counterfactuals and considering the year of
ratification as the time of treatment. For each country, we display the yearly treatment effects in percent and the
respective probabilities of finding such an effect in parenthesis. Finally, we report the (pre-treatment) RMSPE for
each country.
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Table 14: Estimates for Treatment Effects (CO2 per capita) based on US States
Country
Year
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Australia
.07 .17 .07 .09
(.05) (.05) (.20) (.20)
RMSPE: 0.0220
Austria
.06 .14 .13 .17 .14 .06 .07 .04 .10 .11
(.15) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.10) (.40) (.45) (.75) (.40) (.35)
RMSPE: 0.0440
Belgium
-.06 .01 -.07 -.08 -.15 -.18 -.13 -.05 -.06 -.14
(.10) (.90) (.10) (.15) (.05) (.05) (.25) (.65) (.50) (.25)
RMSPE: 0.0460
Canada
.04 -.01 -.01 .00 -.01 .01 .04 .00 -.00
(.10) (.65) (.55) (.90) (.90) (.90) (.70) (1.0) (.90)
RMSPE: 0.0207
Finland
.07 .15 .10 -.09 .17 .13 .05 .03 .23 .11
(.10) (.05) (.10) (.15) (.05) (.15) (.50) (.85) (.05) (.35)
RMSPE: 0.0688
France
.01 .02 -.02 -.00 -.01 -.03 .01 .09 .08 .02
(.90) (.80) (.60) (1.0) (.95) (.50) (.90) (.50) (.50) (.80)
RMSPE: 0.0745
Germany
-.01 .01 -.01 -.03 -.00 -.05 .01 .10 .15 .13
(.85) (.85) (.75) (.55) (1.0) (.40) (.80) (.45) (.25) (.35)
RMSPE: 0.0516
Great Britain
-.01 .00 -.00 -.02 .02 -.03 .01 .02 .06 -.02
(.85) (.95) (.95) (.85) (.60) (.50) (.95) (.85) (.60) (.85)
RMSPE: 0.0264
Italy
.04 .06 .05 .05 .03 .01 .01 -.04 -.06 -.05
(.30) (.15) (.25) (.30) (.55) (.85) (.90) (.75) (.50) (.60)
RMSPE: 0.0212
Japan
.02 .05 .04 .03 -.00 .01 -.02 -.06 -.05 -.03
(.50) (.35) (.30) (.55) (1.0) (.90) (.70) (.60) (.60) (.65)
RMSPE: 0.0250
Netherlands
.02 .06 .03 .02 -.04 -.02 .06 .10 .16 .09
(.50) (.20) (.35) (.70) (.45) (.60) (.50) (.30) (.15) (.40)
RMSPE: 0.0354
Norway
-.04 .03 .00 .01 .08 .08 .25 .25 .46 .23
(.30) (.40) (.85) (.95) (.25) (.35) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.15)
RMSPE: 0.0575
Portugal
.13 .02 .06 .08 -.03 -.03 -.05 -.01 -.12 -.14
(.05) (.80) (.20) (.15) (.55) (.40) (.50) (.90) (.25) (.25)
RMSPE: 0.1361
Spain
.11 .11 .13 .19 .13 .10 .02 -.06 -.17 -.12
(.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.10) (.20) (.60) (.65) (.05) (.25)
RMSPE: 0.0400
Sweden
.15 .10 .07 .02 -.00 -.05 .01 .05 .26 .24
(.05) (.05) (.10) (.85) (1.0) (.40) (.80) (.65) (.05) (.15)
RMSPE: 0.0835
Note: The Table contains treatment effect estimates for CO2 emissions per capita for each Annex B country under
investigation using US states to construct the synthetic counterfactuals and considering the year of ratification as the
time of treatment. For each country, we display the yearly treatment effects in percent and the respective probabilities
of finding such an effect in parenthesis. Finally, we report the (pre-treatment) RMSPE for each country.
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A.6 Accounting for other GHGs
Table 15: Estimates for Treatment Effects based on non-Annex B Countries for all GHGs
Country
Year
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Australia
-.02 .03 -.07 .07
(.65) (.80) (.50) (.50)
RMSPE: 0.0371
Austria
.02 .11 .06 .08 .03 -.01 .00 -.09 -.06 -.10
(.90) (.35) (.80) (.50) (.85) (.95) (1.0) (.70) (.70) (.55)
RMSPE: 0.0768
Belgium
-.05 -.00 -.07 -.08 -.12 -.15 -.13 -.18 -.14 -.14
(.50) (1.0) (.70) (.50) (.50) (.50) (.45) (.40) (.40) (.45)
RMSPE: 0.0319
Canada
.04 .01 .03 .01 .04 .04 .02 -.02 -.01
(.45) (.95) (.85) (.80) (.80) (.65) (.95) (.75) (.95)
RMSPE: 0.0186
Finland
.03 .12 .02 -.13 -.03 -.05 -.16 -.18 -.08 -.19
(.70) (.30) (.90) (.45) (.85) (.70) (.45) (.40) (.50) (.35)
RMSPE: 0.0636
France
-.02 .00 -.04 -.02 -.06 -.08 -.09 -.13 -.14 -.21
(.95) (1.0) (.90) (.80) (.70) (.70) (.70) (.50) (.40) (.35)
RMSPE: 0.0943
Germany
-.03 -.03 -.08 -.10 -.08 -.14 -.11 -.15 -.15 -.19
(.70) (.90) (.65) (.50) (.60) (.60) (.65) (.45) (.35) (.35)
RMSPE: 0.1604
Great Britain
-.03 -.03 -.08 -.09 -.12 -.13 -.20 -.26 -.21 -.29
(.65) (.85) (.65) (.50) (.50) (.60) (.35) (.35) (.25) (.20)
RMSPE: 0.1333
Italy
.02 .06 .03 .04 .00 -.02 -.06 -.15 -.16 -.20
(.95) (.65) (.90) (.75) (.95) (.85) (.80) (.45) (.30) (.35)
RMSPE: 0.0723
Japan
.03 .03 .01 .01 -.00 -.01 -.06 -.07 -.08 -.05
(.65) (.85) (.95) (1.0) (1.0) (.95) (.80) (.70) (.55) (.80)
RMSPE: 0.0645
Netherlands
-.00 .00 -.03 -.05 -.08 -.07 -.07 -.08 -.05 -.11
(1.0) (1.0) (.90) (.70) (.60) (.70) (.75) (.70) (.70) (.55)
RMSPE: 0.0685
Norway
-.01 .05 .03 .01 .03 .01 .02 .04 .03 -.00
(.95) (.65) (.90) (1.0) (.85) (.90) (.90) (.90) (.95) (1.0)
RMSPE: 0.0814
Portugal
.05 -.01 -.03 -.00 -.11 -.12 -.19 -.20 -.29 -.31
(.50) (.90) (.90) (1.0) (.50) (.60) (.40) (.40) (.15) (.20)
RMSPE: 0.0398
Spain
.04 .07 .06 .10 .07 .07 -.02 -.12 -.21 -.24
(.55) (.55) (.70) (.50) (.70) (.70) (.90) (.50) (.25) (.25)
RMSPE: 0.0602
Sweden
.03 .02 -.02 -.08 -.12 -.17 -.20 -.20 -.14 -.20
(.65) (.90) (.90) (.50) (.50) (.45) (.40) (.40) (.40) (.35)
RMSPE: 0.1361
Note: The Table contains treatment effect estimates for each Annex B country under investigation using non-Annex B
countries to construct the synthetic counterfactuals and considering the year of ratification as the time of treatment.
For each country, we display the yearly treatment effects in percent and the respective probabilities of finding such an
effect in parenthesis. Finally, we report the (pre-treatment) RMSPE for each country.
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Table 16: Estimates for Treatment Effects based on US States
Country
Year
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Australia
.00 .08 .01 .23
(1.0) (.15) (.85) (.05)
RMSPE: 0.0220
Austria
.02 .06 .05 .05 .07 -.00 .06 .01 .07 .08
(.55) (.15) (.15) (.25) (.35) (.95) (.50) (.95) (.55) (.50)
RMSPE: 0.0427
Belgium
-.06 -.04 -.09 -.13 -.14 -.20 -.10 -.13 -.09 -.07
(.05) (.40) (.10) (.10) (.05) (.05) (.20) (.10) (.50) (.55)
RMSPE: 0.0537
Canada
.02 -.02 -.02 -.02 .02 .07 .06 .03 .08
(.50) (.50) (.50) (.70) (.80) (.30) (.45) (.70) (.50)
RMSPE: 0.0092
Finland
.02 .11 .06 -.11 .09 .02 -.04 -.02 .08 .02
(.45) (.10) (.15) (.10) (.25) (.75) (.65) (.85) (.55) (.85)
RMSPE: 0.0419
France
-.04 -.05 -.06 -.08 -.05 -.10 -.03 -.02 -.02 -.06
(.20) (.20) (.15) (.25) (.40) (.25) (.70) (.85) (.85) (.65)
RMSPE: 0.0308
Germany
-.01 -.04 -.04 -.10 -.03 -.11 -.06 .13 .17 .07
(.85) (.40) (.25) (.20) (.65) (.20) (.55) (.30) (.20) (.65)
RMSPE: 0.0430
Great Britain
-.03 -.04 -.03 -.07 -.00 -.07 -.06 .05 .08 -.02
(.45) (.40) (.45) (.25) (1.0) (.35) (.55) (.55) (.55) (.85)
RMSPE: 0.0393
Italy
.04 .04 .02 .01 .02 -.04 -.04 -.06 -.07 -.05
(.35) (.40) (.55) (.95) (.70) (.65) (.65) (.50) (.55) (.65)
RMSPE: 0.0157
Japan
.02 .02 -.00 -.02 -.03 -.06 -.11 -.07 -.07 -.01
(.45) (.70) (1.0) (.60) (.60) (.35) (.20) (.40) (.50) (.90)
RMSPE: 0.0117
Netherlands
-.01 -.01 -.01 -.06 -.04 -.08 -.04 .04 .07 .01
(.75) (.75) (.90) (.25) (.50) (.25) (.65) (.60) (.55) (.95)
RMSPE: 0.0189
Norway
-.00 .05 .03 .01 .02 -.01 .01 .03 .05 .05
(.90) (.20) (.40) (.85) (.65) (.90) (.90) (.70) (.55) (.65)
RMSPE: 0.0329
Portugal
.10 .02 .02 .06 -.01 -.04 -.08 -.04 -.15 -.10
(.05) (.65) (.55) (.25) (.85) (.60) (.40) (.65) (.20) (.45)
RMSPE: 0.0265
Spain
.10 .11 .13 .17 .14 .12 .07 .02 -.07 -.03
(.05) (.10) (.10) (.10) (.05) (.15) (.40) (.85) (.55) (.85)
RMSPE: 0.0283
Sweden
.02 .02 -.01 -.06 -.08 -.13 -.12 -.04 .00 -.09
(.55) (.60) (.80) (.25) (.25) (.10) (.20) (.70) (1.0) (.50)
RMSPE: 0.0403
Note: The Table contains treatment effect estimates for each Annex B country under investigation using US states
to construct the synthetic counterfactuals and considering the year of ratification as the time of treatment. For each
country, we display the yearly treatment effects in percent and the respective probabilities of finding such an effect in
parenthesis. Finally, we report the (pre-treatment) RMSPE for each country.
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A.7 Accounting for flexibility mechanisms’ emission credits
Table 17: Estimates for Treatment Effects based on non-Annex B Countries including emis-
sion credits from flexibility mechanisms
Country
Year
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Australia
.03 .07 -.04 .01
(.70) (.65) (.70) (.95)
RMSPE: 0.0371
Austria
.00 .07 .02 .03 -.00 -.06 .04 -.36 -.16 -.23
(1.0) (.60) (.95) (.85) (1.0) (.90) (.85) (.25) (.50) (.55)
RMSPE: 0.0659
Belgium
-.07 .01 -.06 -.11 -.12 -.17 -.02 -.02 -.11 -.14
(.35) (.95) (.80) (.60) (.60) (.60) (.95) (.95) (.65) (.75)
RMSPE: 0.0813
Canada
.05 .01 .02 .00 .00 .01 .01 -.09 -.10
(.45) (1.0) (.95) (.95) (1.0) (1.0) (.90) (.75) (.70)
RMSPE: 0.0472
Finland
.06 .20 .14 -.11 .08 .01 -.06 -.02 -.07 -.17
(.45) (.20) (.55) (.60) (.90) (.95) (.85) (.95) (.75) (.60)
RMSPE: 0.0921
France
-.02 .02 -.03 -.08 -.12 -.18 -.15 -.13 -.19 -.32
(.95) (.95) (.95) (.70) (.60) (.55) (.65) (.85) (.40) (.35)
RMSPE: 0.1124
Germany
-.05 -.03 -.09 -.13 -.12 -.17 -.17 -.12 -.25 -.28
(.60) (.75) (.70) (.45) (.60) (.60) (.55) (.90) (.35) (.50)
RMSPE: 0.1758
Great Britain
-.04 -.02 -.06 -.09 -.08 -.13 -.19 -.09 -.36 -.58
(.60) (.95) (.80) (.70) (.90) (.65) (.45) (.90) (.15) (.10)
RMSPE: 0.0774
Italy
-.01 .02 -.00 -.03 -.03 -.07 -.11 -.12 -.17 -.15
(.95) (.95) (1.0) (.85) (.95) (.90) (.70) (.85) (.50) (.70)
RMSPE: 0.0456
Japan
-.00 .01 -.00 -.03 -.02 -.03 -.06 -.16 -.10 -.05
(1.0) (.95) (1.0) (.85) (.95) (.90) (.85) (.75) (.65) (.85)
RMSPE: 0.0418
Netherlands
.03 .05 .02 -.03 -.04 -.04 -.08 .07 -.06 -.25
(.80) (.70) (.95) (.85) (.95) (.90) (.85) (.90) (.90) (.55)
RMSPE: 0.0579
Norway
-.10 .02 -.00 -.02 .04 .04 .20 .14 .06 -.07
(.20) (.95) (1.0) (.90) (.95) (.90) (.40) (.75) (.85) (.85)
RMSPE: 0.0849
Portugal
.04 -.08 -.09 -.08 -.21 -.20 -.20 -.27 -.29 -.32
(.60) (.35) (.70) (.70) (.25) (.50) (.35) (.30) (.20) (.20)
RMSPE: 0.0510
Spain
.05 .06 .08 .07 .01 .01 -.08 -.14 -.23 -.34
(.50) (.60) (.70) (.75) (.95) (1.0) (.80) (.75) (.35) (.20)
RMSPE: 0.0524
Sweden
.11 .06 .03 -.04 -.06 -.11 -.06 -.01 .01 .04
(.15) (.60) (.95) (.85) (.90) (.75) (.85) (.95) (.95) (.95)
RMSPE: 0.2339
Note: The Table contains treatment effect estimates for each Annex B country under investigation using non-Annex B
countries to construct the synthetic counterfactuals and considering the year of ratification as the time of treatment.
For each country, we display the yearly treatment effects in percent and the respective probabilities of finding such an
effect in parenthesis. Finally, we report the (pre-treatment) RMSPE for each country.
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Table 18: Estimates for Treatment Effects based on US States
Country
Year
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Australia
.07 .17 .07 .15
(.05) (.05) (.20) (.10)
RMSPE: 0.0220
Austria
.04 .12 .11 .14 .12 .03 .11 -.30 .02 -.07
(.30) (.05) (.10) (.05) (.10) (.75) (.15) (.05) (.85) (.45)
RMSPE: 0.0427
Belgium
-.09 -.04 -.08 -.11 -.12 -.17 -.04 -.09 -.07 -.11
(.05) (.30) (.10) (.10) (.10) (.05) (.65) (.25) (.45) (.20)
RMSPE: 0.0537
Canada
.04 -.01 -.01 .00 -.01 .01 .04 .00 -.00
(.10) (.65) (.55) (.90) (.90) (.90) (.70) (1.0) (.90)
RMSPE: 0.0207
Finland
.08 .19 .17 -.06 .20 .13 .05 .05 .14 .02
(.10) (.05) (.05) (.30) (.05) (.05) (.60) (.60) (.10) (.70)
RMSPE: 0.0670
France
-.03 -.00 .00 -.00 .06 .01 .03 -.07 .11 -.08
(.30) (.85) (1.0) (.85) (.25) (.85) (.75) (.55) (.35) (.40)
RMSPE: 0.0724
Germany
-.05 .01 -.02 -.02 .15 .08 .11 .03 .01 .00
(.15) (.85) (.45) (.55) (.10) (.30) (.30) (.80) (.90) (.95)
RMSPE: 0.0457
Great Britain
-.04 -.05 -.03 -.06 .00 -.05 -.13 .03 -.17 -.47
(.25) (.30) (.20) (.35) (1.0) (.40) (.10) (.80) (.10) (.05)
RMSPE: 0.0298
Italy
.02 .05 .02 .02 .03 .00 -.03 -.04 -.03 -.02
(.70) (.30) (.40) (.55) (.50) (.95) (.75) (.75) (.80) (.70)
RMSPE: 0.0238
Japan
.01 .03 .01 -.01 -.03 -.05 -.07 -.17 -.12 -.08
(.95) (.40) (.85) (.75) (.55) (.40) (.35) (.10) (.10) (.30)
RMSPE: 0.0194
Netherlands
.00 .01 .00 -.03 -.07 -.06 -.10 .02 -.03 -.24
(.95) (.65) (1.0) (.55) (.25) (.35) (.25) (.85) (.65) (.05)
RMSPE: 0.0373
Norway
-.10 .02 -.00 -.01 .04 .04 .20 .21 .10 -.01
(.05) (.60) (.90) (.80) (.40) (.70) (.05) (.05) (.30) (.70)
RMSPE: 0.0607
Portugal
.15 -.00 -.06 -.07 .02 .04 .07 -.01 .07 .11
(.05) (1.0) (.15) (.15) (.85) (.70) (.35) (.85) (.50) (.35)
RMSPE: 0.0803
Spain
.07 .07 .07 .11 .10 .11 .00 -.07 -.08 -.23
(.10) (.15) (.10) (.10) (.10) (.05) (1.0) (.50) (.35) (.05)
RMSPE: 0.0297
Sweden
.10 .10 .08 .03 .16 .09 .20 .15 .23 .31
(.05) (.05) (.10) (.55) (.10) (.25) (.05) (.10) (.05) (.05)
RMSPE: 0.0814
Note: The Table contains treatment effect estimates for each Annex B country under investigation using US states
to construct the synthetic counterfactuals and considering the year of ratification as the time of treatment. For each
country, we display the yearly treatment effects in percent and the respective probabilities of finding such an effect in
parenthesis. Finally, we report the (pre-treatment) RMSPE for each country.
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This Online Appendix contains the graphs of actual and counterfactual emissions paths
and the corresponding placebo studies for all 15 countries under investigation for the two
main specifications and all robustness checks discussed in the paper.
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Ratification of the KP as the treatment event (Main specification)
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Adoption of the KP as the treatment event
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